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Abstracts 
 
This thesis consists of four papers. The titles and abstracts of the various essays are as 
follows. 
 
Paper 1: Tenure Insecurity, Transaction Costs in the Land Lease Market and 
Implications for Gendered Productivity Differentials  
 
This study assesses the link between land leasing behavior and productivity differentials 
between male and female-headed households. A double-moral hazard model allows us 
to show that the landlord’s tenure insecurity leads to a sub-optimal level of effort on the 
tenant’s part, via its impact on the likelihood of contract renewal. The model also 
predicts that a high search cost of a landlord leads to a higher probability of contract 
renewal. A lower probability of contract renewal leads to lower levels of tenant’s effort, 
and vice versa. The empirical findings support the hypotheses that female household 
heads have lower enforcement ability and that tenure insecurity is a significant negative 
determinant of productivity. However, the results show no support for a lower 
likelihood of contract renewal by female-headed households or for a significant impact 
of contract renewal on productivity.  
 
Paper 2: Heterogeneous Risk Preferences, Transaction Costs and Land Contract 
Choice 
The paper analyzes how heterogeneities in risk preferences, rate of time preferences and 
transaction costs affect the choice of contracts among participants in the land lease 
market. The analysis draws from both agency and transaction cost theories, which 
propose alternative explanations of contract choice. Unique data from Ethiopia, 
containing experimental risk, rate of time preference measures and transaction costs are 
employed in the analysis. Tenant characteristics are more important than those of 
landlords in explaining contract choice. The results do not support the risk-sharing 
hypothesis of the agency theory as a motivation for contract choice while there is some 
support that discount rates and transaction costs affect contract choice. The results also 
 viii
indicate that the land lease market serves as a resource pooling mechanism by bringing 
poorer landlords and tenants into sharing arrangements. 
Paper 3: Biodiversity Conservation Under an Imperfect Seed System: The role of 
Community Seed Banking Scheme 
The study is an empirical investigation of agrobiodiversity conservation decisions of 
small farmers in the central highlands of Ethiopia. The primary objective is to measure 
the effectiveness of Community Seed Banking (CSB) in enhancing diversity while 
providing productivity incentives. Our results indicate a significant impact of 
participation in CSB on farm-level agrobiodiversity. However, the level biodiversity 
conservation was not found to have the expected reinforcing impact on participation 
indicating no support for simultaneity. CSB participation also led to increase in 
productivity consistent with the need for such incentives to enhance diversity at a farm 
level. Our assessment of the performance of the GLS estimator yielded a significant 
discrepancy between the GLS and bootstrap estimates. This led to the conclusion that 
bootstrapping asymptotic estimations might be required for appropriate inference. 
 
Paper 4: Environmental Change, Species’ Coping Ability and the Insurance Value 
of Biodiversity 
This paper develops a measure of the value of biodiversity by incorporating a stochastic 
change in the environmental factor into an economy-ecosystem model of biodiversity. 
The analysis draws from an ecological model specifying the relationship between 
aggregate productivity, responsiveness to environmental change, and diversity. The 
value of biodiversity is derived as the contribution of diversity in enhancing the 
ecosystem’s adaptive response to environmental change. The results are relevant to 
biodiversity conservation efforts that target areas with differing degrees of 
environmental variation. In addition, our analysis of some features of global warming 
the results imply that with increased concerns of global warming, more needs to be 
invested in biodiversity. 
 ix
Preface 
I developed the interest in assessing the economic constraints rural households face 
from my exposure to the issue in my undergraduate and graduate classes. This doctoral 
study has enabled me to pursue my interest in contributing to a formal, albeit humble 
analysis of the issue. For this, I wish to express my sincere gratitude to the 
Environmental Economics Unit for accepting me as a PhD student, and to Sida for 
financing this study.  
My deepest thanks goes to my supervisors Fredrik Carlsson and Gunnar Köhlin 
who greatly contributed to this study and to my professional development, through their 
intellectual guidance and relentless support. I am very thankful for all their insights, 
critical comments and for their optimism about my research projects. Fredrik has always 
traced flaws in my arguments and methods, and has shown me the totally different side 
of my story. Gunnar’s intriguing questions about the value of the research questions I 
raise and the links between them and policy were critical in defining what I need to do.  
Great thanks are also due to my co-author Stein for his insights, guidance and 
valuable criticizims and for his invitation to the various seminars and defenses in Ås. 
Also to Anne-Sophie, my supervisor on my last paper, for leading me through 
interdisciplinary research and for making me finish what at times seemed 
insurmountable.   
I am greatly indebted to John Pender who has been generously offering his 
intellectual support and his time and has immensely contributed to this work. He has 
been instrumental in suggesting some ideas, shaping up my ideas and providing 
valuable comments on the draft versions of the papers.  
I would also like to thank Jesper Stage, the discussant at my Final Seminar and 
Ragnar Oygard, the discussant at my Licentiate Seminar for their kind comments. 
Several others have also contributed to this work by commenting on the papers at the 
different stages. Thanks are due to Wisdom Akpalu, Peter Berck, Demeke Bayou, Alian 
de Janvry, Salvatore Di Falco, Magnus Hennlok, Olof Johansson-Stenman Elias Kassa, 
Bereket Kebede, Philip Keefer, Karl Göran Mäler, Jon Norberg, Peter Parks, Thomas 
Sterner, Tesfaye Teklu, Roger Wahlberg, Jiegen Wei, Hans-Peter Weikard, Anastasios 
Xepapadeas, Yosief Wondmagegne, and Precious Zikhali. 
 x
Many thanks to my friends Wisdom, Rahi, Martine and Jorge for the great team 
we were in the first two years during course work. They also deserve gratitude for all 
the discussions we had regarding the thesis, our future careers, and their friendship in all 
the years. Thanks, Wisdom, for always being there for me, betam amesegnalehu. 
 I am indebted to my colleagues and friends at EEU: Anders Ekbom, Astrid 
Nunez, Clara Villegas, Daniel Slunge, Daniela Roughsedge, Elina Lampi, Elizabeth 
Foldi, Fredrik Carlsson, Gerd Georgsson, Gunnar Köhlin, Haoran He, Håkan Egert, 
Innocent Kabenga, Jesper Stage, Jiegen Wei, Jorge Garcia, Karin Jonson, Katarina 
Renström, Kofi Vondolia, Magnus Hennlok, Martin Linde-Rahr, Martine Visser, 
Miguel Quiroga, Pham Khanh Nam, Olof Drakenberg, Olof Johansson-Stenman, Peter 
Martinsson, Qin Ping, Precious Zikhali, Rahimaisa Abdula, Thomas Sterner, Yonas 
Alem, and Åsa Lofgren. Many thanks to Thomas and his family for making sure that I 
know enough about Swedish entertainment and tradition. I would also like to thank the 
professors and students at the department of Economics who have been my teachers and 
colleagues. 
Thanks are also due to Elizabeth Földi, Katarina Renström, Eva-Lena Neth, Eva 
Jonasson, Anna Karin Agren and Gerd Georgsson for their efficient administrative 
support. Thanks Eliza for going out of your way to help me in non administrative 
matters as well, for being easy to talk to and for making the long trips we happened to 
share comfortable and fun, Egziabher yistillign. 
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the people at the Beijer 
International Insitute of Ecological Economics: Karl Göran Mäler, Sara Aniyar, Anne-
Sophie Crepin, Carl Folke, Christina Leijonhufud, Anna Sjoström, Tore Söderqvisitm, 
Max Troell, Sandra Lerda and Jessica Andersson. Their hospitality and support was 
incredible whenever I happened to be at the institute for courses or for attending the 
prestigious research seminars.  
My stay in Göteborg has been enjoyable not only because I was doing what I 
love to do but also because I was surrounded with entertaining friends: Amele, Precious, 
Anatu, Innocent, Astrid, Ping, Jiegen, Mulu, Marcella, Mahmud, Carl, Nizamul, Ulrika, 
thank you all!  
I would also like to thank my family in Stockholm, Argaw, Zeni, Kassahun and 
Zewdu for providing me with a much needed relaxing environment whenever I happen 
 xi
to be in Stockholm. I would also like to thank Mahlet, Staffan, Tamrat, Mikky, Selam 
and Ronak for their friendship. 
 I am indebted to my teachers and colleagues at Alemaya University for being 
great teachers and incredible colleagues. Belay Kassa, Wegayehu Bekele, Workneh 
Kasssa, Belaineh Legesse and Kebede Kassa deserve special thanks. Outside Alemaya, I 
wish to express my gratitude to Ruerd Ruben, Henk Folmer, Arie Kuyvenhoven and 
Alison Burrell for encouraging and supporting me to undertake a PhD study and 
afterwards. A special thanks goes to my friend Aster for bringing an opening about this 
program into my attention. 
I owe the success of both the surveys I have undertaken for this dissertation to 
the dedication and hard work of the data collection team and to the kind cooperation of 
the respondent farmers in Gojjam, Wollo and Chorisa. Special thanks to Melkie Taye, 
Girma Mengistu and Sisay Tadesse for assisting me in conducting the pilot surveys and 
coordinating the main surveys. I would like to thank Ayneye for typing the 
questionnaires in Amharic. Thanks are also due to Debbie and Anatu for proofreading 
the thesis and making it readable. 
The contribution of my ever loving and caring family is colossal. The support of 
my brothers Behailu and Dawit, my sister Ayneye and my mother Mesaytu, and their 
enthusiasm about my success has not only been the reason for me to finish what I have 
started but also the motivation behind setting what I pursue next. Yalenante meswaitnet 
hilme iwin ayhonim neber. 
Thank you God for answering my prayers in a period of endless great need.   
 
 
Mintewab Bezabih 
Februrary 2007 
 xii
 
 xiii
Introduction 
 
Acute poverty, physical and economic alienation, and severe vulnerability to natural and 
anthropogenic factors characterize rural households in low-income countries, which 
mainly derive their livelihood from agriculture and related activities. This manuscript 
deals with the economic choices that households make and their impact on welfare in 
low-income, rural settings where the production environment is fragile and uncertain, 
market opportunities are limited, and underlying institutional settings are less than fully 
favorable. Particular focus is placed on Ethiopia, a country where overwhelming 
majority (85%) of its 77 million citizens are rural; and agricultural performance, even in 
good years, is dire (FAO,2001).  
In light of this, the thesis consists of four papers aiming to assess the role of 
institutional and market constraints as well as natural environmental factors in 
conditioning the economic choices rural households make and the impact of the choices 
on the households’ welfare. In particular, focus is made on determining access to land, 
productivity, and the management of biodiversity. The first two papers deal with the 
role of institutional, socio-cultural, and local market constraints in conditioning the 
performance of land lease markets. The last two papers focus on the incentive structures 
in managing indigenous planting materials and the differentials in the value of diversity 
under varying degrees of environmental uncertainty. 
In a predominantly agricultural economy like Ethiopia, land is a critical factor of 
production owing to the fact that it is an immobile natural asset which is a source of 
livelihood, investment, and wealth. Moreover, unlike other inputs in agricultural 
production, access to it depends on the national tenure system set up by the government. 
A distinct feature of the Ethiopian land tenure1 system is state-ownership of land that 
bestows land to peasant farmers on usufruct basis. An obvious implication of this form 
of private land access is its ban on sale, which limits land ownership2 to village-
administered (re)distribution. An additional implication is that such an ownership 
                                                 
1 Land tenure is defined as a system of rights and institutions governing access to and use of land and 
other resources (Bruce, 1998) 
2 In the sense it is used throughout the thesis, private land ownership refers to access to land by a 
household that involves own-use of land for production, short and medium term rentals and inheritance to 
immediate members of family. 
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structure induces tenure insecurity among the farmers who have experienced/expect to 
experience land redistribution in a manner that affects their farm size. Moreover, 
population pressure and ever decreasing farm size constitute a limit to redistribution as a 
viable form of land access. 
The limited access to ownership under the existing tenural arrangement provides 
a wide space for the development of vibrant land lease markets that transfer land to 
landless/land-poor households. Indeed, land leasing increasingly constitutes an 
important source of land access and transfer. Many studies indicate that, in a given 
village, 30% or more households are engaged in leasing in/out (Teklu, 2004). However, 
the development of land leasing comes against the background that past policies have 
also outlawed all forms of land transactions. This could have a cascading impact in the 
sense that experience with land leasing is at an early stage and hence the land lease 
market may not be fully developed yet. Moreover, the underlying tenure insecurity of 
the land owning households may set an additional barrier.  
In line with this, the first paper deals with the interactions between the 
underlying tenure insecurity of land owning households and socio–cultural settings that 
may condition land-leasing behavior. In particular, we look into the leasing behavior of 
households where the head of the family is a woman, and compare these to male headed 
ones. The land ownership patterns of female-headed households are different from those 
of male-headed households in three major ways. One is that formal titling of women to 
land ownership is a fairly recent phenomenon. Previously, women could inherit land 
from their parents or deceased husbands; they could not, however, claim ownership 
upon divorce or could not be included in village redistribution schemes if they do not 
already own land (Gebreslassie, 2005). Even with recent legislations that ascertain their 
entitlement to redistributed land and right to claim land upon divorce, effective claim 
has been less than complete. Upon divorce, for instance, asking for part of the land, 
although legally rightful, may lead to alienation by the community members. It might 
also be impractical in situations where a woman is married to a man in a different 
village than her home village since dividing up the land might require the woman to live 
outside her home village, in which asking for her share of the land is “inappropriate” in 
the first place. Similarly, upon the death of the spouse, although it is the woman who 
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generally keeps the land, her in-laws might be inclined to interfering in the management 
and the lease of the land.  
This is also reinforced by the fact that there is a taboo against women 
undertaking major farming activities (Gebresilassie, 2005), which effectively bars them 
from managing their own land, and hence their heavy reliance on leasing out land for 
production. By emphasizing the socio-cultural constraints that typify female land 
ownership in Ethiopia, the first paper of the thesis spots key land-leasing features that 
distinguish female land-owners from their male counterparts. Differentials in tenure 
insecurity, enforcement ability, and other transaction costs related to search and 
screening in the land lease market are identified as the most critical factors. The paper 
goes on to identify the role of these key factors in maintaining the gender gap in 
agricultural productivity in Ethiopia.  
The major role of the land lease market is to transfer land from less efficient to 
more efficient producers without actually transferring ownership rights. A wide variety 
of such transfer arrangements exist, each with a distinct set of input and output sharing 
rules. On the basis of previously established theories and empirical analyses regarding 
multiple contractual arrangements, it can be argued that leasing households attempt to 
address concerns regarding risk preferences, liquidity constraints, as well as attributes of 
trading partners. Heterogeneities with respect to such concerns among landlords and 
tenants tend to be aligned with the range of rules regarding input and output sharing. 
The second paper of the thesis analyzes how heterogeneities in risk, credit constraints, 
and transaction costs affect the choice of alternative contracts among participants in the 
land lease market.  
In economies where insurance, output, seed and input markets work perfectly, 
seed portfolio decisions reflect input and output market price concerns only. However, 
in agricultural economies like that of Ethiopia, because of very low market integration 
and high production risk, production decisions go beyond ordinary profit maximization 
to incorporate yield stability as well as varying consumption requirements. As a result, 
production is largely subsistent and highly diversified. Hence, diversity in planting 
materials is the base for attaining the multiple objectives at the farm level. In addition, 
diversity provides the possibility to combine complementary planting materials that are 
adaptable to moisture, temperature, and soil type variability.  Furthermore, it maintains 
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the available pool of genetic materials for breeding to enhance productivity and ensure 
environmental stability. Moreover, moving towards a more market-oriented production 
relies on understanding the opportunities in diversification, tradeoffs in productivity and 
their interaction with the conditioning natural environment, which is highly uncertain.  
While Ethiopia is not one of the mega-diversity centers compared to Central 
American, Southeast Asian or Central African countries, it has a considerable wealth of 
diversity in food crops and their wild relatives (Edwards, 1991). Indeed, owing to its 
huge altitudinal variation, 3 Ethiopia is home to a number of food crop varieties suited to 
the dry and high temperature conditions of the lowlands and the wet and cooler 
temperature conditions of the highlands. 
Nonetheless, long-running neglect for agrobiodiversity has led to a huge loss of 
planting materials. While this has a cost to the global environment in general, the loss of 
diversity in planting materials threatens the livelihoods of millions of small holders who 
have local seeds as their major source of planting materials. Thus, reversing the 
biodiversity loss and enhancing its conservation calls for understanding of farm-level 
incentives for and constraints to conservation at a farm level. 
Given this, the aim of the third paper is to look into farm-level incentives in 
landrace variety conservation in light of imperfections in seed systems, which lead to 
overall constraints to seed access. The study brings together several interlinked issues: 
on-farm conservation of crop genetic resources, household decision making, and the 
role of seed systems to address the question of how policies or programs like 
Community Seed Banking impact household decisions. It also assesses the resulting 
farm level diversity and what tradeoffs exist between diversity and productivity.  
The last paper takes a wider perspective of studying biodiversity conservation 
decisions in the context of considerable environmental volatility. In line with this, the 
objective of the paper is to come up with a measure of biodiversity that provides 
guidelines to differential policies in biodiversity conservation under different degrees 
and patterns of environmental uncertainty. The valuation exercise is based on an 
ecological model of evolution of a biodiverse ecosystem that models interspecies 
relationships and their performance in connection to the external environment.    
                                                 
3  Ethiopia has more than half of the total highland and mountain areas of Africa, the altitudnal effect of 
which dissipates the arid and semiarid climate prevalent in the Sahel Zone (Edwards, 1991). 
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In sum, the thesis attempts to address what we identify to be critical issues in 
using, leasing and accessing land, a major factor of agricultural production with 
multifarious socio-cultural, political and behavioral dimensions.  In addition, the thesis 
endeavors to tackle issues surrounding the concern in biodiversity conservation with a 
special focus on diversity as a source of planting material and as an insurance against 
environmental uncertainty. 
The intricate development and natural resource use problems of poor rural 
economies provide a myriad of policy and academic challenges, calling for a deeper 
look into institutional, socioeconomic, and cultural factors that act as stumbling blocks 
to the economic progress of small agricultural households. In the words of T.W. Schultz 
(1979) in Barrett (2003): 
‘ Most of the people in the world are poor so if we know the 
economics of being poor, we would know much of the economics 
that matters. Most of the world’s poor people earn their living from 
agriculture, so if we know the economics of agriculture, we know 
much of the economics of being poor. ’ 
In light of the research questions that we attempted to address in this 
manuscript, we feel that two major gaps need to be filled to further understand the 
constraints to rural development and natural resource management. One is the lack of a 
comprehensive understanding of the determinants and patterns of access to rural factor 
and output markets. One way of addressing this could be to employ sampling 
procedures that take into account not only observed participants in the market but also 
“potential” participants that are not “observed” as participants. In addition, gaining a 
fully contextual grasp of the economic decisions that rural households make constitutes 
another formidable challenge. In line with this, attempts to study rural household 
behavior in an inter-disciplinary approach that takes behavioral, socio-cultural, political 
and natural environmental factors, into account could be an additional path for future 
research. 
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Abstract 
This study assesses the link between land leasing behavior and productivity differentials 
between male and female-headed households. A double-moral hazard model allows us 
to show that the landlord’s tenure insecurity leads to a sub-optimal level of effort on the 
tenant’s part, via its impact on the likelihood of contract renewal. The model also 
predicts that a high search cost of a landlord leads to a higher probability of contract 
renewal. A lower probability of contract renewal leads to lower levels of tenant’s effort, 
and vice versa. The empirical findings support the hypotheses that female household 
heads have lower enforcement ability and that tenure insecurity is a significant negative 
determinant of productivity. However, the results show no support for a lower 
likelihood of contract renewal by female-headed households or for a significant impact 
of contract renewal on productivity.  
 
JEL classification: D2, Q12, Q15, C21, C7. 
Key words: productivity; Female-headed households; Contract renewal; Tenure 
insecurity; Enforcement ability 
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1. Introduction 
Empowering poor and vulnerable household groups in a fundamental manner, as 
opposed to providing them with transitory support, has been increasingly sought as a 
way of ensuring their effective participation in the development process (Barrett et al., 
2006). Hence, the importance of identifying the underlying institutional constraints 
vulnerable household groups face has been receiving considerable attention In line with 
this, the study focuses on female-headed households1, and the institutional and socio-
cultural constraints they face in poor rural communities in Ethiopia. 
A number of studies have noted a systematic downward bias in the productivity 
of female-owned plots (e.g. Holden et al., 2001; Tikabo, 2003). Such results persist 
irrespective of attempts to control for differences in labor endowment and 
heterogeneities in land quality. Even within the same household, empirical evidence 
from Burkina Faso (Udry, 1996) shows that plots controlled by women are farmed 
much less intensively than similar plots within the household controlled by men. 
Female-headed households are characterized by lack of assets (including 
draught power) as well as labor shortage. 2 Under conditions where factor markets are 
working perfectly, female-headed households would be able to hire in labor and oxen or 
rent out land to adjust the cultivated area to other factors of production the household 
possesses. This would make up for the potential inefficiency in production created by 
labor/oxen shortage and the resulting “excess” cultivated land in proportion to the 
availability of labor/oxen. Equivalently, this would dissipate the productivity 
differentials between the less labor/oxen endowed female-headed households and the 
more labor/oxen endowed male-headed households. However, the markets for the 
complementary non-land factors (i.e. labor and oxen) are characterized by notorious 
imperfections and, thus, cannot play effective factor adjustment roles. The land rental 
market is then sought as the main mechanism by which households may adjust 
                                                 
1 In rural Ethiopia, female household heads comprise the poorest part of the population.  Many of them 
are widows, separated or women who live on their own making a living out of selling liquor. They are 
characterized as the most resource poor, having a small amount of land, usually no pair of oxen, no full 
farm equipment, insufficient adult labor and little working capital.  
2  This is true for Ethiopia where there is a taboo against women doing certain farming operations like 
ploughing with oxen. 
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cultivated area to their access to the semi- or non-tradable factor endowments3 
(Deininger and Binswanger, 1982; Tikabo, 2003). Accordingly, female-headed 
households would rely heavily on the land lease market as a mechanism to adjust their 
factor endowments to cultivated area.  
On the other hand, the extent to which land lease markets contribute to factor 
adjustment depends on the performance of the land market itself. Hence, the better the 
performance of the land market in terms of adjusting factor endowments to cultivated 
area, the higher the agricultural productivity per unit of land. The main objective of this 
paper is to seek explanations to productivity differentials between male and female 
households in terms of differences in land leasing behavior. Particularly, we plan to test 
the impacts of household differences in tenure insecurity, contract renewal and 
enforcement ability as factors explaining productivity differentials. As mentioned 
earlier, the existence of productivity differentials between male and female owned farms 
has been documented in previous studies. However, our study is the first to assess why 
such differences exist by linking them to the socio-cultural and institutional settings that 
Ethiopian peasant farmers operate under and by the subsequent differences in their land 
leasing behavior.  
In societies where the main agricultural activities are undertaken only by men, 
there are tendencies to disregard the role of women as farmers (Mutimba and Bekele, 
2002), which may lead to an undermining of women’s positions as farmers and 
landowners. Historically, for instance, village-level land redistributions have been 
gender-uneven with women losing out disproportionately (Crummy, 2000). This might 
induce systematically higher tenure insecurity of female-headed households compared 
to male-headed ones. This might manifest in their decision to lease, since they might opt 
for shorter-term rental contracts. This is because female headed households would fear 
that tenants might establish claims towards their land if the same tenant continues to 
stay on the land for long. In line with this, Bellemare and Barrett (2003) argue that when 
choosing the terms of contract, the landlord considers the impact of his/her choice on 
the probability that he/she will retain future rights to the rented land. On the tenant’s 
part, expectations of being evicted from the (rented) land may curb the incentive to 
exert a high level of effort. 
                                                 
3 By factor endowments, we are referring to land, oxen and active labor that the household has under its 
possession. 
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In addition, female landlords might not be regarded as knowledgeable farmers 
by tenants; thus tenants would have incentives to under-provide effort on land rented 
from female landlords. This is particularly true during peak labor and oxen seasons 
(days), when the tenant is labor constrained and meeting labor requirements of both his 
and the landlord’s land is straining. Thus, female-headed households may need to exert 
extra monitoring and supervision to ensure an optimal level of tenant.  
In sum, this study hypothesizes the following: heterogeneities with respect to 
tenure security lead to a lower likelihood of renewing contracts with the same tenant, 
which reduces the tenant’s incentives to exert a high level of effort. This could lead to 
lower land productivity of female landlords. On the other hand, the inability of female 
headed households to enforce the terms of the contract may lead to lower tenant effort 
and hence lower productivity.  
The paper is organized as follows:  In the next section we give the theoretical 
background of the paper. The estimation methodology along with some considerations 
in the estimation procedure is provided in Section 3. Section 4 details the survey design 
and data employed in the empirical analysis. Section 5 presents the empirical findings 
and section 6 concludes the paper.  
 
2. The Model  
Our main premise is that female landlords are tenure insecure and face higher costs of 
search screening and monitoring (higher transaction cost) in the land lease market. 
Higher tenure insecurity and a high level of transaction cost could make female-headed 
households behave differently from their male counterparts in terms of land leasing 
behavior. Tenure insecurity might lead to a lower likelihood of contract renewal and a 
higher transaction cost might be associated with inability to find a good quality/ a hard 
working tenant or lower contract enforcement ability. The tenant may tailor his effort in 
accordance with the prospect of contract renewal and the landlord’s enforcement ability. 
The resulting difference in tenant effort could lead to a difference in productivity 
between rented plots of male and female headed landlord households.  
Given this, the essence of the model is to assess how landlord tenure insecurity 
and transaction costs faced in the land lease market are linked to the tenant’s optimal 
level of effort. As with any other contractual arrangement, land transactions could take 
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place for shorter or longer durations.4 When search processes are costless and the 
landlord is fully secure about his/her land ownership, a shorter duration contract is as 
good as one of longer duration in terms of search cost. With positive search costs and 
full tenure security, however, a longer duration contract is more attractive as it reduces 
search costs for both parties. Thus, the landlord is then expected to renew the contract 
and the tenant expected to work harder not to be evicted from the land. On the other 
hand, if the landlord is less than fully tenure-secure, longer term contracting could 
induce the risk of losing land to the tenant. Thus, to the landlord, deciding on the 
contract renewal involves weighing the benefit of reduced search cost against the risk of 
losing the land to the tenant. Similarly, to the tenant, deciding on the level of effort to 
exert entails weighing the benefit of increased production against the chance of being 
evicted from the (rented) land. Accordingly, a landlord with higher tenure security will 
be more likely to renew the contract since the risk of losing land is going to be low. 
Furthermore, a tenant is likely to exert larger effort on land where contract renewal is 
more likely.  
We consider a contract by a landlord and a tenant that stipulates output sharing 
conditions from rented out land. However, the tenant’s effort, which is not observable to 
the landlord, will be one of the critical aspects of the land leasing arrangement that is 
not stipulated in the contract. Unobservability of tenant effort leads to moral hazard on 
the tenant’s part since he could shirk on effort.  
Another vital element in the land leasing arrangement that is not stipulated in the 
contract and that is also a source of moral hazard is the possibility that the landlord 
renews contract with the same tenant. In the Ethiopian context, contracts are typically 
entered for one year with a possibility of renewal. Unobservability of the likelihood of 
contract renewal by the landlord constitutes a source of moral hazard on the landlord’s 
part. This situation leads to a double moral hazard problem where the landlord’s 
decision to renew the contract is not observed by the tenant and the tenant’s choice of 
optimal level of effort is not observed by the landlord.  
                                                 
4 In this context, short duration contracts refer to one-year (one production season) agreements, while 
longer duration contracts involve repeated and continuous renewals with the same tenant. 
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The landlord’s problem: 
What we formulate in the landlord’s problem is the relationship between the constraints 
faced by female household heads in the land lease market and their tendency to renew 
contracts. We argue that female landlords are tenure insecure and face higher 
transaction costs of search and contract enforcement in the land lease market. Because 
of the tenure insecurity, there is a tendency for them to renew contracts less often. On 
the other hand, high search cost for a tenant may increase the likelihood of renewing a 
contract with the same tenant.5 
We consider the landlord’s standard expected utility function from production 
profit with positive search costs that is augmented to allow for the risk of losing the land 
due to longer-term rentals. 6  The landlord’s profit function is represented by the total 
revenue from agricultural production net the cost of searching for a tenant. The revenue 
is represented by the function, θ f , where θ  is a positive random variable with an 
expected value of unity, intended to embody the effects of uncertainty in the agricultural 
production (Eswaran and Kotwal, 1985), and where f  is an increasing function of 
effort. The cost of time and resources that the landlord incurs searching for the tenant is 
given by Lc and α  represents the share of the total output that goes to the tenant.7  Since 
it is actual output that is observable to the landlord, we set Q=θ f . Given this, at each 
period, the landlord will have the option of: 1) terminating the contract with the current 
tenant, incurring a search cost and obtaining a new tenant without running into the risk 
of losing land, or 2) renewing the contract with the same tenant and running into the risk 
of losing the land to the tenant. The first scenario (terminating the contract and 
searching for a new tenant) is represented by the following net profit function:  
(1 ) LR Q cπ α= − −               (1) 
Under this scenario, the landlord gets a share of the output represented by 
(1 )Qα−  and incurs a search cost, Lc . The second option (renewing the contract with 
the same tenant) gives the following profit equation:  
                                                 
5 Transaction cost in the land lease market includes the cost of search, screening and monitoring and we 
only model the search cost aspect here while in the empirical analysis, we use the combined costs and 
refer to them as enforcement ability. 
6 We have assumed that a fixed amount of land is to be rented out and the risk of losing land is associated 
exclusively to contract renewals.  
7 Fixed rentals are very few in the data, thus we have assumed away linear contracting.  
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(1 )(1 )A G Qπ α= − −                       (2) 
Here the landlord does not incur any search cost and he/she is guaranteed to get 
the share of the output, (1 )Qα− , with probability, G, that he/she loses the rented out 
land. In other words, the landlord faces the risk that the tenant attempts to expropriate 
land and stops paying the share to the landlord. Equation (3) represents the determinants 
of the probability that the landlord loses the rented out land:  
( , , , , , )s sG G E g L T Cl S=                    (3) 
G is a composite variable which is a function of E, is the tenant’s ability to 
expropriate the land; g, the gender of the household head; sL , the landlord’s 
socioeconomic characteristics; sT , the tenant’s socioeconomic characteristics; Cl, the 
duration of the contract; S, policy variables that condition the extent to which the 
landlord is secure about his/her tenure. S could include experience of village level 
redistribution, future expectations of redistribution, experience of conflict, and sense of 
ownership (Holden and Ghebru, 2005).                
Let w be the discounted present value of expected utility for a landlord who is 
deciding whether to renew a contract or not to renew the contract. The utility function is 
given by: 
[ ]
0
1
(1 ) 0
(1 )(1 ) 1
Lw EU Q c if h
w
w EU G Q if h
α
α
⎧ ⎡ ⎤= − − =⎪ ⎣ ⎦= ⎨ = − − =⎪⎩
                      (4) 
where h is a binary variable which takes a value one if the landlord decides to renew the 
contract and zero if the decision is to not renew the contract. The maximization problem 
is a choice between two actions: renew the contract or terminate the current contract and 
engage in searching for a new tenant. The condition for optimization is given by the 
switch point, at which the landlord is indifferent between renewing and terminating the 
contract. In other words, the condition for optimality is given by equating the terms 
corresponding to 0h =  and 1h = in equation (4), which is given by: 
 [ ](1 ) (1 )(1 )LEU Q c EU G Qα α⎡ ⎤− − = − −⎣ ⎦              (5) 
which is equivalent to:   
(1 ) (1 )(1 )LQ c G Qα α− − = − −             (6) 
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Equation (6) could be solved for *Q , the level of output that makes the landlord 
break the old contract and go for a new tenant.  
*
(1 )
LcQ
Gα= −               (7)  
The landlord will have an expectation of the output he/she is getting, which is 
denoted by 
_
Q  . The decision of whether or not to renew the contract/ not is based on the 
levels of *Q  and 
_
Q . If 
_
*Q Q≤ , then the landlord will stick with the old tenant and will 
renew the contract. However, if 
_
*Q Q> , the landlord will be better off not renewing the 
contract and searching for a new tenant.  
Based on (7), comparative statics give the following relationship between *Q  and 
the search cost, Lc , and the risk of losing land, G. 
( )2
* 0
1
LQ c
G G α
∂ = − <∂ −                (8) 
* 1 0
(1 )(1 )L
Q
c G α
∂ = >∂ − −                (9) 
 
Thus, from (8) we can see that higher G decreases, *Q , the level of output that 
makes the landlord go for a new tenant.  This is because when G is high, the risk of losing 
land is high and the amount of output the landlord requires to be compensated for the risk of 
losing land increases. Hence, the level of output required by the new tenant will be lower. 
The intuitive interpretation of (8) is that if the landlord is likely to lose the land to the tenant 
because of renting out, then the landlord would need higher compensation in terms of 
output in order to renew the contract. Equation (9) shows that a higher search cost of the 
tenant increases *Q . This is because a higher search cost increases the level of output the 
landlord demands from the new tenant.  
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Proposition 1: Higher risk of expropriation reduces the probability of contract renewal  
by the landlord.  
Proposition 2: Higher search cost by the landlord increases the probability of contract 
renewal by the landlord.  
The empirical implication of proposition (1) is that tenure insecurity, which 
increases the risk of land expropriation, decreases the likelihood of contract renewal. 
Similarly, higher search cost, reduces the probability of contract renewal. Thus, female-
headed households, who are supposedly tenure insecure households are less likely to 
renew contracts with the same tenant than their male counterparts while higher search 
cost leads to higher probability of contract renewal.  
  
The tenant’s problem:  
The tenant’s optimization problem considers the decision on the level of effort to put 
into production by taking into account the conditions of land leasing. In particular, we 
consider the effects of the probability of contract renewal and the tenant’s search cost on 
the optimal level of tenant’s effort. 
In contracting the land, the tenant has two options: attempting to expropriate the 
land and not attempting to do so. The decision to go ahead with attempting to 
expropriate the land could lead to success or failure with some probabilities. If the 
attempt succeeds, the tenant would enjoy a stream of lifetime income from the land, 
where the yearly income is represented by S . If the attempt fails, the tenant not only 
loses the prospect of renewing contract with the same landlord, but also damages his 
reputation and getting a good land becomes more difficult for him. We capture this 
damage in reputation as the inability to obtain the same quality land as before incurring 
the same search cost. Hence the production function of the tenant if expropriation is not 
successful is represented by nf , which is lower than if the tenant did not face a damage 
in reputation. EC  represents the cost of expropriation. Thus, the decision to expropriate 
could follow the following pattern. 
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1
1
( ( ) )
rt
rt n T
E
S if expropriation is successful
Z
f e c C if expropriation is not successful
e
e αθ
∞ −
∞ −
⎧⎪⎪= ⎨⎪ − −⎪⎩
∑
∑
     (10) 
The decision to expropriate is dependent on the tenant’s power to expropriate. 
We keep the tendency of expropriation (and its outcome) independent of effort. 
However, if he does not attempt to expropriate the land, he retains the prospect of the 
contract being renewed for him by the landlord. 
In a situation where the tenant is not attempting expropriation, his optimization 
problem depends on the probability of contract renewal. The decision to renew the 
contract, h, is observed only as a probability P, to the tenant. Thus, at every period, the 
tenant could get a renewal with a probability P and a termination probability (1-P). 
Upon termination, the tenant would have to incur a search cost Tc  to find another land 
with the same quality, thus identical production function. The disutility to the tenant I 
exerting effort is given by k(e). The likelihood of contract renewal, P, is a function of 
the probability that the landlord loses the rented out land to the tenant, G, and effort, e 
where, 0P
G
∂ <∂ , 0
P
e
∂ >∂ and 0
P
e G
∂ <∂ ∂ . In other words, the probability of contract 
renewal decreases with the risk of losing land and increases with effort. In addition, the 
responsiveness of the likelihood of contract renewal to effort decreases with the 
probability that the landlord loses the rented out land to the tenant. 
With this, the tenant’s problem is given by: 
max ( )( ( ) ( )) (1 ( ))( ( ) ( ) )T
e
v EV P e f e k e P e f e k e cαθ αθ⎡ ⎤= − + − − −⎣ ⎦         (11) 
which is equivalent to: 
max ( ( ) ( ) ) ( ))T T
e
v EV f e k e c P e cαθ⎡ ⎤= − − −⎣ ⎦           (12) 
The condition for optimality is given by: 
( ) 0Te e e
v f k P c
e
αθ∂ = − + =∂             (13) 
The first two terms in the expression, ( )e ef kαθ − give the standard conditions for 
determining the optimal level of effort under linear contracting (sharecropping). The last 
term, TePC , gives the additional effort as a result of the probability of contract renewal 
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which depends on the responsiveness of the probability to effort and the search cost the 
tenant faces upon non renewal.  
Proposition 3: The likelihood of contract renewal has a positive impact on the tenant’s 
 effort.  
The results are in line with the model and empirical findings of Kassie and 
Holden (2006) in Western Gojjam, Ethiopia. 
 
3. Empirical Methodology and Estimation Considerations 
The aim of this section is to set up a framework for analyzing the link between land 
leasing behavior and the gender gap in agricultural productivity. First, we specify the 
relationships between gender of the household head and land productivity to investigate 
the existence of significant productivity differences between farms owned by male and 
female household heads. To assess differentials in land leasing behavior, we define the 
econometric relationships between contract renewal, gender, tenure security and 
enforcement ability. Finally, investigate if a significant proportion of the differences are 
attributable to differences in the working of the land lease market by studying the 
relationships between productivity, contract renewal and tenure insecurity as additional 
determinants in the productivity regression.  
3.1.The existence of gender gaps in productivity  
As per the standard productivity analysis, plot-level productivity is determined by plot 
characteristics and household level characteristics. In addition, because some plots are 
leased, lease status is included as an additional determinant of productivity. 
Accordingly, the econometric relationship is specified as:  
ip ip ip ip ip ipy L g X R uα ϖ γ µ ϑ= + + + + +          (14) 
where for household i and plot p; ipy  is the value of output per ha; ipL represents 
socioeconomic characteristics including gender; ipX  is physical farm characteristics of 
the plot; ipR  stands for the plot’s lease  status; α ,  ω  π  and ζ are the respective 
coefficients to be estimated; and ipu  is an error term. 
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In order to see whether differences exist between leased and non-leased plots, 
we estimate a Treatment Effects regression where the treatment variable is the plot’s 
lease status.  
Up to this point, we have ruled out the possibility that heterogeneities exist with 
respect to land leasing behavior. In other words, equation (1) implicitly assumes that the 
choice to lease is a decision determined by an exogenous set of factors with no bearing 
on productivity. However, as argued in Section 2, differences in underlying tenure 
insecurity and enforcement ability should lead to differences in land leasing behavior 
and eventually to differences in tenant effort (productivity). Sections 3.2 and 3.3 present 
the econometric relationships that allow for such analyses.  
3.2. Contract Renewal 
Analysis of the contract renewal decision is done using a bivariate probit model 
with sample selection. The estimation procedure involves two stages where in the first 
stage a possible sample selection is addressed by estimating a selection equation for 
leased out versus non-leased plots. In the second stage, a survival equation is estimated 
where the dependent variable is contract renewal. For the ith household and pth plot, the 
selection equation that represents whether a plot is leased out or not is given by:  
1 0,
0
P P
ip ip ip
ip
if L X v
P
otherwise
β γ⎧ + + >⎪= ⎨⎪⎩
       (15) 
where ipP  is an indicator variable equal to 1 if plot is leased out, ipL  is a vector of 
socioeconomic characteristics, ipX  is a vector of physical  farm characteristics and ipv  
is an error term. 
The survival equation is given by  
1 * 0
0
ip ip ip ip ip ip ip ip ip
ip
if L T g Cl Cl g S E w
h
otherwise
φ ψ π η µ γ λ ε+ + + + + + + +⎧= ⎨⎩
?
          (16)               
where ipL represents socioeconomic characteristics; ipCl is the number of years the tenant 
has managed plot p of household i ; ipT is a set of variables measuring the tenant 
characteristics; ipS  represents the underlying tenure security variables; * ipCl g is the 
interaction between gender and contract renewal; iph is a dichotomous variable 
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indicating whether a contract will be renewed or not for the next production year; 
ipE represents  the enforcement variables and ipw is the error term. 
3.3.Productivity analysis including land leasing behavior 
Considering heterogeneous land leasing behavior implies taking contract renewal and 
tenure insecurity as additional determinants of productivity.  Since plots that are rented 
out are likely to be systematically different from plots that are not rented out, the 
selection problem is addressed by estimating the plot lease status selection equation 
given in (15). The productivity equation for the non-leased plots is given by:  
N N N N N N
ip ip ip ip ip ipy L g X Sα ϖ γ µ δ ϖ= + + + + +            (17) 
The productivity equation for the leased plots is given by: 
*T T T T T T
ip ip ip ip ip ip ip ipy L g X S h Tα ϖ γ µ δ ϕ ϖ= + + + + + + ∂ +           (18) 
The variable definitions follow from equations (14) and (16). ipϖ  represents the 
error terhm and the superscripts N and T represent non-leased and leased plots 
respectively. To estimate the selection equation along with the leased out and non-
leased out plot regimes, we employ an endogenous switching regression estimation. In 
addition, since contract renewal is endogenous in equation (18); direct use of the 
variable in the regression would lead to biased and inconsistent estimates. Thus, we use 
an instrumental variable estimation where a predicted value of the contract renewal is 
used in estimating equation (16). Hence *iph represents the predicted value of contract 
renewal. 
In order to construct the instrumental variable for contract renewal, we formed 
groups of households by Kebele. With 12 Kebeles in our sample, we ended up with 12 
groups of households. The average contract renewal of all households within a group 
other than that of the household itself is calculated for each household to form the 
instrument for contract renewal.  
 
4. The data 
We gathered the data employed in the empirical analysis from households in two 
districts of the Amhara National Regional State, a region that encompasses part of the 
Northern and Central Highlands of Ethiopia. One of the Zones (Districts), East Gojjam 
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is a fertile plateau receiving good average rainfall while the South Wollo zone is 
characterized by degraded hill side plots receiving lower and highly erratic rainfall.  
Our sampling is based on a larger complementary a survey that involved 
approximately 2000 households. Among the 2000 households, information on about 
230 landlord households (130 male-headed and 100 female headed) and matching 
tenants are included in this study. Table 1 and Table 2  present the summary statistics 
and definition of the variables used in the regressions. 
The survey consists of details of socioeconomic and physical farm 
characteristics of the landlord households. In addition, socioeconomic characteristics of 
tenant households are also included. The level of transaction costs faced in the land 
lease market and the degree of contract enforcement are represented by kinship between 
the tenant and the landlord, the extent to which the landlord is satisfied with the 
performance of the tenant and the landlord’s inability to monitor the performance of the 
tenant. Tenure insecurity is measured in terms of past experience of changes in land 
holdings, expectations about changes in holdings and experience of conflict.   
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Table 1: Description of variables used in the regressions 
Variables Description 
Landlord socioeconomic  
Education      
Age 
Female 
Male adult 
Female adult 
Livestock 
Oxen 
Zone  
Flat slope plot 
Moderate slope plot 
Fertile soil 
Medium fertile soil 
Black soil 
Red soil 
Plot area 
Farm area 
Plot distance 
Addis mender 
Addis gudguadit 
Ambamariam 
Chorisa 
Kebi 
Kete 
Sekela debir 
Telima 
Weleke 
Yamed 
Amanuel 
Inputs 
Fertilizer  
and farm Characteristics 
Head’s formal education (1=read and write; 2= read only; 3=none) 
Age of household head 
Gender of the household head 
The number of male working-age family member of the landlord per ha 
The number of female working-age family member of the landlord per ha 
The number of livestock per ha 
The number of oxen per ha 
Zone the household belongs in (1=Gojjam; 0=Wello) 
Flat slope of the plot (1=flat; 0=not flat) 
Medium slope of the plot (1=medium; 0=not medium) 
Fertile plot (1=fertile; 0=not fertile) 
Medium fertile plot (1=medium fertile; 0=not medium fertile) 
Plot with black soil color (1=black; 0=not black) 
Plot with red soil color (1=red; 0=not red) 
Total farm size (ha) 
Plot size (ha) 
Distance of the plot from homestead (minutes) 
Dummy for Kebele 1 (1=addismender;0=other) 
Dummy for Kebele 2(1=Gudguadit;0=other) 
Dummy for Kebele 3 (1=Ambamariam;0=other) 
Dummy for Kebele 4 (1=chorisar;0=other) 
Dummy for Kebele 5 (1=kebi;0=other) 
Dummy for Kebele 6 (1=kete;0=other) 
Dummy for Kebele 7 (1=sekeladebir;0=other) 
Dummy for Kebele 8 (1=telima;0=other) 
Dummy for Kebele 9 (1=welekie;0=other) 
Dummy for Kebele 10 (1=yamed;0=other) 
Dummy for Kebele 11 (1=amanuel;0=other) 
 
Amount of fertilizer applied (kg) 
  16
Manure    
Tenant  
Tenant’s age 
Tenant’s oxen 
Enforcement 
Blood relation 
Spouse relation 
Blood relation*female 
Spouse relation*female 
Satisfaction 
 
Satisfaction*female 
 
Inability to monitor 
 
Inability to monitor*female 
 
Contract renewal 
 
Contract renewal*female 
 
Predicted survival 
 
Tenure security  
Security 
 
Changeland 
 
Conflict  
Dependent  
Productivity 
Contract renewal   
Lease out 
Amount of manure applied (kg) 
Characteristics 
Tenant’s age 
The number of oxen owned by the tenant 
Variables 
A dummy variable indicating whether the tenant is a blood relation or not (1=blood relation, 0=no) 
A dummy variable indicating whether the tenant is an in-law or not 
A dummy variable indicating whether the tenant is a blood relative given that the landlord is a female 
A dummy variable indicating whether the tenant is an in-law given that the landlord is a female 
A dummy variable indicating whether the landlord is satisfied with the performance of the tenant (1=satisfied, 
0=otherwise) 
A dummy variable indicating whether the landlord is satisfied with the performance of the tenant given that the 
landlord is a female 
A dummy variable indicating whether the landlord is unable to monitor the activities of the tenant (1=unable to 
monitor, 0=otherwise) 
A dummy variable indicating whether the landlord is unable to monitor the activities of the tenant given that the 
landlord is a female 
A dummy variable indicating whether the current tenant will get contract renewal or not in the following 
production year 
A dummy variable indicating whether the current tenant will get contract renewal or not in the following 
production year given that the landlord is a female 
The predicted probability that the current tenant will get contract renewal or not in the following production 
year 
Variables 
Whether the landlord expects increase, no change or decrease in the land size in  the coming five years 
(1=decrease 2=no change 3=increase) 
Whether the landlord has experienced change in the landownership in the last five years  (1=change, 0=no 
change) 
Whether the landlord has experienced any conflict regarding the land 
Variables 
The value of production per ha.  
Whether the contract will be renewed or not in the next production year (1=renewal; 0=non-renewal) 
The lease status of the plot (1= Leased, 0=owner operated) 
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Table 2: Summary statistics of variables used in the regressions 
 Mean St.Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Education 1.581 0.871 1 3 
Female 0.348 0.477 0 1 
Age 55.902 18.191 13 95 
Adult male 0.534 1.055 0 9 
Adult female 0.414 0.900 0 9 
Livestock 4.009 13.572 0 394 
Oxen 1.095 1.904 0 13 
Fertile plot 0.344 0.475 0 1 
Medium fertile plot 0.421 0.494 0 1 
Black soil 0.344 0.475 0 1 
Red soil 0.520 0.500 0 1 
Flat slope plot 0.633 0.482 0 1 
Moderate slope plot 0.239 0.427 0 1 
Plot distance plot 20.6 41.3 0 900 
Plot size 0.255 0.169 0 1 
Farm size 1.330 0.808 0 4 
Addisgudguadit 0.093 0.290 0 1 
Chorisa 0.022 0.145 0 1 
Addismeder 0.040 0.196 0 1 
Yamed 0.079 0.270 0 1 
Ambamariam 0.078 0.269 0 1 
Kete 0.092 0.289 0 1 
Sekeladebir 0.093 0.290 0 1 
Telima 0.087 0.282 0 1 
Wolekie 0.084 0.278 0 1 
Kebi 0.117 0.322 0 1 
Manure 166.3 583.0 0 7600 
Fertilizer 49.8 127.1 0 2381 
Tenant's age 2.315 0.803 1 3 
Tenant's oxen 1.977 1.074 0 8 
Blood relation  0.427 0.495 0 1 
Spouse relation 0.129 0.335 0 1 
Spouse relation*female 0.053 0.224 0 1 
Blood relation*female 0.160 0.367 0 1 
Inability to monitor 0.083 0.276 0 1 
Inability to monitor*female 0.033 0.179 0 1 
Satisfaction 0.638 0.481 0 1 
Satisfaction*female 0.239 0.426 0 1 
Security 1.829 0.866 1 3 
Changeland 0.132 0.339 0 1 
Conflict 0.196 0.397 0 1 
Contract duration 4.696 3.763 1 20 
Contract duration*female 2.267 3.861 0 20 
Contract choice 3.991 0.991 1 5 
Predicted survival 0.925 0.161 0 1 
Survival 0.806 0.396 0 1 
Logvalue (yield) 6.858 1.233 0 11 
Lease  0.645 0.479 0 1 
 
  18
 
Land owning farm households may or may not engage in the land lease market. 
Accordingly, they are categorized as ‘autarkic’, ‘landlords’ or ‘tenants’. For those who 
engage in the land lease market, they might do so partially or fully i.e. by renting out 
all/part of the plots. Table 3 presents the nature and extent of participation in the land 
lease market by gender category. 
Table 3: Socioeconomic and endowment characteristics by household head gender 
Socioeconomic characteristics 
 Age Education Family 
size 
Adult family 
members 
Oxen  Livestock 
(tlu) 
Female 52.71 
(16.48) 
1.21 
(0.61) 
4.05 
(2.11) 
2.64 
(1.28) 
0.34 
(1.05) 
1.13 
(1.86) 
Male 55.67 
(18.48) 
1.85 
(0.95) 
6.00 
(2.27) 
3.88 
(1.69) 
0.80 
(1.23) 
2.71 
(3.01) 
Tenure security indicators 
 Conflict Certificate Security 
Female 0.20 
(0.41) 
1.19 
(0.57) 
2.5 
(0.88) 
Male 0.19 
(3.97) 
1.17 
(0.56) 
2.56 
(0.94) 
Land market participation 
 Farm 
size 
Plot 
size 
Non leased 
plot 
Shared in 
plot 
Shared out 
plot 
Rented in 
plot 
 
Rented out 
plot 
 
Female 1.04 
(0.61) 
0.25 
(0.19) 
0.32 
(0.46) 
0 0.62 
(0.48) 
0 0.07 
(0.08) 
Male 1.79 
(1.03) 
0.24 
(0.08) 
0.45 
(0.49) 
0.02 
(0.14) 
0.47 
(0.49) 
0.004 
(0.64) 
0.015 
(0.12) 
 
5. Results 
5.1.The existence of gender gaps in productivity 
Table 4 presents the Ordinary Least Squares and Treatment Effects estimation results 
for the pooled leased and non leased plots along with selection equation results for the 
plot’s lease status.  
In the productivity equation, plots owned by female-headed households are 
significantly less productive. This is in line with previous studies which have shown 
that there is a gender gap in land productivity. This is so even after controlling for the 
effect of leasing out (using a dummy for leased plots), and the possibility that female 
and male households might not benefit equally from land leasing. Plot size is a 
significant negative determinant of productivity, while the impact of farm size is not 
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significant, likely because that of plot size picks up the effect of farm size. Male adult 
per unit of land is a significant positive determinant of productivity while tropical 
livestock units and oxen (all measured per unit of land), are insignificant. Education and 
age of the household head are insignificant. Zone is insignificant while many of the 
village variables are significant. This conforms to the expectation that agroecological 
and institutional (market) characteristics, which are likely to be different across villages, 
affect productivity in a significant manner.   
The selection equation results for plot lease status indicate that female owned 
plots are more likely to be leased out. However, other socioeconomic characteristics like 
education and the number of male and female members per ha. are not significant. As 
would be expected, households with more oxen per ha are less likely to lease out land 
while the total tropical livestock units of the household per ha., which we use to proxy 
for wealth is not a significant determinant of the decision to rent out. Larger total land 
area decreases the probability of leasing out land, while a larger plot size increases the 
likelihood of leasing out.  Plots distant to the homestead are not significantly more 
likely leased to be rented out.  Plots with moderate slope are likely to be rented out 
while other plot characteristics are not significant.  
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Table 4: Ordinary Least Squares and Treatment effects Estimates of Pooled Plot level 
Productivity    
 
OLS 
estimates of  
productivity   
Treatment effects 
estimates of  
productivity Plot rent equation  
Variable 
Coefficient  Std.dev Coefficient  Std.dev Coefficient  Std.dev 
Zone 0.471 1.174 0.574 1.438   
Plot size -2.594*** 0.376 -2.901*** 0.672 1.336*** 0.458 
Farm size -0.297** 0.148 -0.129 0.225 -0.397*** 0.094 
Livestock -0.001 0.009 -0.000 0.011 0.017 0.015 
Oxen 0.017 0.055 0.021 0.063 -0.081** 0.038 
Adult male 0.080 0.059 0.113* 0.065 -0.002 0.045 
Adult female -0.028 0.057 -0.041 0.060 -0.053 0.035 
Female -0.486** 0.189 -0.451* 0.270 1.047*** 0.129 
Age  0.009** 0.004 0.007 0.005 0.005 0.004 
Education 0.174* 0.091 0.106 0.109 0.087 0.063 
Fertile plot 0.082 0.247 0.132 0.266 -0.201 0.148 
Medium fertile plot -0.039 0.234 -0.011 0.252 -0.157 0.139 
Black soil -0.649* 0.347 -0.694 0.463 0.023 0.223 
Red soil -0.594 0.371 -0.605 0.487 -0.176 0.208 
Flat slope plot 0.501 0.359 0.400 0.334 0.263 0.213 
Moderate slope plot 0.481 0.341 0.343 0.369 0.413* 0.221 
Manure 0.000** 0.000 0.000** 0.000   
Fertilizer 0.002* 0.001 0.002* 0.001   
Lease  0.054 0.178     
Plot distance     0.004 0.003 
Constant  0.269*** 0.082 1.140 0.967 0.437 0.008*** 
Number of 
Observations 981 
 * significant at 10%,  ** significant at 5%,  ***significant at 1% 
Note: 1. Dependent variable is the value of yield per hectare (‘000).  
2. Kebele Dummies are included in the productivity but not in the plot rent equations. Some are 
significant. 
3. Standard errors are bootstrapped. 
5.2. Contract renewal  
Table 5 presents the results from the survival analysis along with the selection equation 
representing the lease status of the plot. Female heads are not less likely to continue 
contracts with the same tenant than male heads. However, it should be noted that the 
magnitude of the coefficient is large and negative. On the other hand, female-headed 
households that are unable to monitor are less likely to renew contracts. Among the 
kinship variables, male tenants are less likely to renew contracts with blood relatives, 
while other kinship variables are found to be insignificant for both male and female 
household heads. The landlord’s experience of land gain or loss and expectations of 
future changes in the land size are significant and negative determinants of contract 
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renewal, among the tenure security variables. However, expectation of future land 
redistribution and experience of conflict are insignificant. 
Older and more educated households are more likely to renew contracts. Of the 
tenant characteristics included, the number of oxen the tenant has is not a significant 
determinant of contract renewal. Older tenants are less likely to get their contracts 
renewed. 
In addition, results from the lease status selection equation follow the same 
pattern as the selection equation result in Section 5.1. except that the likelihood of 
renting out does not significantly differ between female and male owned plots, in this 
case. 
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Table 5: Bivariate Probit Model with Selection Estimation Results for the  
             Likelihood of Contract Renewal on Rented Plots 
    
Variable Contract Renewal Equation Selection Equation 
 Coefficient  Std. Err. Coefficient  Std. Err. 
Security -0.041 0.091   
Changeland -0.677** 0.268   
Conflict -0.026 0.221   
Female -1.509 2.377 0.142 0.118 
Age 0.012** 0.005 0.012** 0.005 
Education 0.229* 0.124 0.166*** 0.062 
Blood relation -0.392* 0.209   
Blood relation*female 0.202 0.314   
Spouse relation  -0.181 2.358   
Spouse relation *female -0.284 2.413   
Tenant’s age -0.321*** 0.115   
Tenant’s oxen -0.006 0.089   
Inability to monitor 0.290 0.264   
Inability to monitor*female -0.767* 0.459   
Satisfaction 0.793*** 0.268   
Satisfaction*female 0.456 0.720   
Ability to find another tenant 0.013 0.181   
Ability to find another tenant*female 0.348 0.762   
Contract renewal*female 0.061 0.077   
Contract renewal 0.017 0.038   
Male adult   -0.074* 0.041 
Female adult   0.002 0.033 
Livestock   -0.006 0.011 
Oxen   -0.081** 0.035 
Farm size   -0.409*** 0.085 
Plot size   1.041*** 0.402 
Flat slope plot   0.194 0.219 
Moderate slope plot   -0.001 0.261 
Black soil   0.216 0.218 
Red soil   0.282 0.262 
Plot distance   0.004* 0.002 
Fertile plot   -0.211 0.177 
Moderate fertile plot   -0.115 0.146 
Constant  2.925*** 0.076 0.717 0.693 
Number of Observations 981 
* significant at 10%,  ** significant at 5%,  ***significant at 1% 
Note:  Standard errors are bootstrapped. 
5.3.Productivity analysis including land leasing behavior 
Table 6 presents the endogenous switching regression estimation for the determinants of 
productivity.  The gender dummy variable is not significant in the leased regime. 
However, it is negative and significant in the non-leased regime confirming our 
hypothesis that female owned plots exhibit lower productivity. However, contract 
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renewal1, the link via which land owner’s tenure insecurity is linked to tenant’s level of 
effort, is insignificant.  Since tenure insecurity and contract renewal are likely to be 
strongly correlated, the insignificance of contract renewal might be explained by its 
effect being picked up by the tenure insecurity variables.  
In addition, in the leased regime, plot size is a negative determinant of 
productivity while farm size has a weaker but significantly negative impact. The effect 
of previous experience of conflict and expectations of reductions in the size of holdings 
both have negative effects on productivity of leased plots. This indicates that tenure 
insecurity indeed has a negative impact on the productivity of lased plots. The number 
of oxen the tenant has is a negative and significant determinant of productivity. The 
number of oxen the tenant has is a negative and significant determinant of productivity. 
This is a likely result in our case where the production environment is constrained by 
oxen availability and the more oxen a tenant has, the more number of lease 
arrangements the tenant may take up. 
Total livestock ownership and oxen ownership are positive and significant 
determinants of productivity in the non-leased regime. While the other tenure security 
measures are insignificant, experience of change in the size of holdings has a positive 
impact on the productivity of non-leased plots. However, the impacts of plot level 
fertility, soil type and slope are generally weak. In addition, socioeconomic 
characteristics like age and education of the household and are insignificant.  
The lease selection equation results are similar to the selection equation 
estimations in the previous sections. One major difference is that plot distance is a 
significant determinant of leasing out indicating that distant plots are more likely to be 
leased out.  
 
                                                 
1 Contract renewal is for the coming production year while productivity is for the current production year.  
It should also be noted that, since contract renewal is likely to be endogenous, we used the predicted 
contract renewal in the regression 
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Table 6: Endogenous switching regression results of the determinants of productivity 
 Lease out               equation Productivity Equation: 
Non leased pots 
Productivity Equation: 
Leased plots 
Plot distance 0.002** 0.001     
Plot size -1.311*** 0.307 -4.191*** 1.011 -2.314*** 0.582 
Farm size -0.266*** 0.079 0.576* 0.340 -0.339** 0.149 
Livestock 0.064 0.021 0.218** 0.083   
Male adult 0.020 0.038 -0.056 0.137   
Female adult -0.023 0.022 0.070 0.108   
Oxen -0.101** 0.048 0.427** 0.202   
Female 0.423 0.132 -1.386*** 0.433 -0.310 0.206 
Age 0.005 0.003 -0.001 0.011 0.012** 0.005 
Education 0.077 0.056 -0.038 0.191 0.061 0.114 
Fertile plot -0.169 0.141 0.416 0.444 0.145 0.259 
Merium fertile plot -0.193 0.138 0.282 0.462 0.036 0.251 
Black soil 0.234 0.171 -0.924* 0.544 -0.546* 0.329 
Red soil -0.038 0.152 -0.277 0.500 -0.533* 0.320 
Flat slope plot -0.049 0.186 0.496 0.543 -0.092 0.381 
Moderate slope plot 0.180 0.196 -0.177 0.598 0.200 0.398 
Fertilizer   0.052 0.105 -0.048 0.061 
Manure   -0.134 0.401 -0.573** 0.217 
Security   0.035 0.290 -0.504*** 0.167 
Changeland   4.192*** 0.519 0.471* 0.255 
Conflict   0.340 1.731 -2.076*** 0.449 
Tenant's age     0.056 0.066 
Tenant's oxen     -0.250** 0.108 
Predicted survival     -0.434 0.299 
Constant   -0.605 0.789 2.685*** 0.341 
Sigma(0)     -0.747*** 0.235 
RHO(0.u)     1.407*** 0.097  
Sigma(1)     0.661** 0.244 
RHO(1.u)       
Number of 
observations 981 
* significant at 10%.  ** significant at 5%.  ***significant at 1% 
  
Note: Standard errors are bootstrapped. 
6. Conclusions 
Does gender discrimination have an impact on earnings and economic performance? 
This question has been widely examined in labor market studies where possibilities for 
differential wage payment exist. This paper assesses the possibility of discrimination 
against women and its impact on their productivity in a poor small farm setting where 
women are factor owners and employers. Because the main agricultural activities are 
undertaken by men, there are tendencies in such settings to disregard the role of women 
as farmers. This might undermine their landownership and weaken their bargaining 
position in the land lease market.  Hence, we argue that women might be more tenure 
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insecure and might have lower bargaining positions in the land lease market compared 
to their male counterparts and this would have a negative impact on tenant’s effort and 
productivity. 
In order to assess the role of women’s tenure insecurity and bargaining power in 
maintaining the gender gap in productivity, we set up a double moral hazard model of a 
landlord and a tenant that allowed us to show the importance of landlord tenure 
(in)security in the determination of the optimal current level of tenant effort. The model 
also predicts that a high tenure security of a landlord leads to a higher probability of 
contract renewal. In turn, a lower probability of contract renewal leads to lower levels of 
tenant’s effort, and vice versa.  
The empirical analysis started out by establishing that female owned plots 
exhibit significantly lower productivity, which is in line with the findings by other 
studies. Tenure insecurity is shown to reduce the likelihood of contract renewal while 
contract renewal is not less likely for plots leased out by female landlords. As per the 
theoretical predictions, productivity is positively affected by tenure insecurity; however 
the impact of contract renewal is insignificant.  
In sum, given the long history of women’s lack of property rights over their 
land, an important policy progress has been made by formally entitling them to land 
rights. One important implication of our result is that a full stride towards empowering 
rural women and in land rights requires their proper recognition as farmers. This would 
enable them to feel more tenure secure and have better bargaining power in the land 
lease market and would eventually lead to closing the gender gap in productivity. At a 
more general level, this indicates that ensuring that informal grounds are leveled is 
important in order to obtain the expected results from a policy change.  
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Abstract 
 
The paper analyzes how heterogeneities in risk preferences, rate of time preferences and 
transaction costs affect the choice of contracts among participants in the land lease market. 
The analysis draws from both agency and transaction cost theories, which propose 
alternative explanations of contract choice. Unique data from Ethiopia, containing 
experimental risk, rate of time preference measures and transaction costs are employed in 
the analysis. Tenant characteristics are more important than those of landlords in explaining 
contract choice. The results do not support the risk-sharing hypothesis of the agency theory 
as a motivation for contract choice while there is some support that discount rates and 
transaction costs affect contract choice. The results also indicate that the land lease market 
serves as a resource pooling mechanism by bringing poorer landlords and tenants into 
sharing arrangements. 
JEL Classification: C93, D00, Q02  
Key Words: Contract Choice, Risk Preferences, Transaction Cost, Rate of Time 
Preferences 
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1. Introduction 
 
The organization of agricultural land transactions through contracts and the coexistence of 
multiple contracts has been the subject of much discourse in the economics literature. One 
reason for this pertains to the need to understand the prevalence of sharecropping with its 
perceived inefficiency vis-à-vis other contract forms (Hayami and Otsuka, 1993) as well as 
the distributional and access implications. However, despite immense academic and policy 
interest, contract choice studies have remained largely inconclusive. This study is an 
endeavor to contribute to understanding of land leasing1 contractual arrangements by 
incorporating simultaneous heterogeneity with respect to risk preferences, time preferences 
and transaction costs into previous theories and explanations to contract choice.   
In particular, our analysis draws from the two major streams of the broad literature 
that attempts to explain the coexistence of multiple contracts and their efficiency 
implications. A pioneering explanation is what is commonly called the agency theory, 
which claims that attempts to balance risk bearing and production incentives dictate 
contract choice and sharecropping comes out as an arrangement that addresses the two 
concerns optimally. However, a later approach, the transaction cost theory, counters the 
assertion by the agency theorists, arguing that uncertainty provides wider space for 
opportunistic behavior by tenants, which makes rental contracts optimal incentive 
mechanisms under uncertainty.  In addition, our approach also borrows from recent 
empirical studies regarding the role of imperfect markets in contract choice that attempt to 
bridge the gap in theoretical and empirical findings by the agency and transaction cost 
explanations.  
 We argue that combined individual heterogeneity with respect to attitude towards 
risk and risk sharing, ability to curb opportunistic behavior, and liquidity constraints offers 
a more comprehensive explanation to the patterns of existing land contracts. In line with 
                                                 
1 Land lease in this paper includes all land transactions that take place between a household in a farming 
community, who gives  (part of) his/her land to another household in exchange for money or share of output, 
for a short period of time. The alternative land lease arrangements (contracts) considered in this study are rent, 
pure sharecropping and cost sharing.   
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this, the objective of this study is to assess the combined impact of risk-sharing, transaction 
costs, and liquidity constraint/discount rate. We have a number of hypotheses. In poor rural 
communities where production is weather dependent, output risk becomes an important 
concern. For a landlord, less input/output sharing means less production risk. Thus, risk 
averse landlords are expected to have a stronger preference for rental contracts than other 
landlords. In addition, an inability to contribute to inputs due to liquidity constraints and 
high discount rates make rental contracts attractive. Thus, landlords with a higher rate of 
time preference are more likely to go for rental arrangements.  
However, consumption-smoothing concerns might make sharing arrangements 
superior to rental payments. Consumption smoothing concerns are associated with the fact 
that collecting upfront payments at the beginning of the season2 leaves the landlord with no 
income to expect at the end of the season3 and hence with no income for the rest of the 
year. An additional argument could be that the value of rentals is very low compared to the 
present value equivalent of sharecropping. Moreover, the landlord loses money if he/she 
uses the money collected from rental to buy crops, since crops are more expensive in the 
off-season (when rental money is collected) than in the on-season (during and after 
harvest). While the money from rental could be saved to buy cheap on-season crops, the 
months from May to October is a period where households struggle to feed themselves4, 
making it hard to save the money. Landlords are also aware of the downside of 
sharecropping, the classical inefficiency it induces with respect to tenant effort. For 
landlords inclined to go for sharecropping, ensuring an optimal level of effort requires 
effective supervision of tenant labor. Thus, landlords with a higher ability to search are 
more likely to go for sharing contracts. This would make the landlord’s ability to search, 
screen and monitor an important determinant of contract choice.   
                                                 
2 In the setting we are studying, main season harvests take place November-January. Contractual agreements 
take place around April. Since rental agreements involve upfront payment, the landlord collects the money in 
April, while under sharing agreements the output is given to the landlord the following January.  
3 This was revealed to us upon discussion with some of the respondents. Fixed rent contracts are even referred 
to as yebelto-tenesh, which literally means an arrangement that involves emptying the plate.  
4 The period mentioned is popularly known as the hungry season across the poor developing world (See 
Hoddinott and Yohannes, 2002) in which households exhaust the stock of harvest but have highest nutritional 
needs due to the need to undertake the labor-demanding agricultural activities during that period. 
 32
From the tenant’s point of view, rate of time preference may be important since 
upfront payment and input contribution are related to liquidity and credit constraints. In 
addition, risk-averse tenants would prefer pure sharecropping/cost sharing as a risk-sharing 
alternative. However, because of the supervision requirements of contracts involving 
input/output sharing, tenant characteristics become critical for sharing contracts. Thus, 
whether tenants with more preference for sharing get such contracts depends on their ability 
to search and to send signals that they are worthy tenants.  
The empirical analysis assesses contract choice decisions by introducing the 
possibility of heterogeneity of transacting agents with respect to both risk preferences, time 
preferences and transaction costs simultaneously. While assessment of the effects of risk, 
discount rate and transaction cost are not new in the contract choice literature, this study is 
the first attempt to simultaneously look at these factors. Moreover, previous studies rely on 
proxies as measures of these factors. According to Akerberg and Botticini (2002) proxies5 
for both risk and market imperfection measures lead to matching errors and biased 
estimation results. Similarly, transaction cost studies focus on measures of transaction costs 
related to the nature of inputs or the nature of crops, and so far no study in agricultural 
contract studies has looked into individual level transaction costs. 6  
Section 2 presents a review of existing studies on land leasing contractual 
arrangements. The data and the context of analysis along with definition and construction 
of variables are given in Section 3. This is followed by section 4 where the econometric 
framework is discussed. The hypotheses stated in Section 1 will be empirically tested in 
section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.  
 
2.  A Review of Alternative Contractual Arrangement Explanations  
 
Studies regarding the choice of alternative agricultural land leasing arrangements are 
mainly based on two streams of literature: the agency and transaction cost explanations. 
                                                 
5 Wealth and crop riskiness are used as risk aversion and market imperfection measures in the studies. 
6 Examples of individual-level transaction cost studies include Gebremadhin’s (2003) work on the impact of 
individual level transaction costs on the choice of brokerage and Atkins and Dye’s(1997) work on stock 
market exchange. 
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According to the agency theory, concerns over alignment of risk bearing and production 
incentives are what dictate an agent’s choice of one contract over another (Matsen & 
Saussier, 2002). Marshall (1890) put forward the inefficient-sharecropping argument later 
known as the Marshallian inefficiency. It suggests that with sharecropping arrangements, it 
is in the best interest of a profit maximizing tenant to under-provide effort since he is not 
the full claimant of the residual effort. In this regard, rental arrangements give the first best 
results since the tenant has the full incentive to provide an optimal level of effort. On the 
other hand, without supervision, the tenant has the lowest incentive to provide effort under 
wage contract. Thus wage contracts give the lowest level of effort compared to the other 
contract forms.  
However, under rental/wage contract, production risk is borne by the 
tenant/landlord respectively. Sharecropping could in this sense become a risk-sharing 
arrangement where production risk is shared between the tenant and the landlord. In line 
with this, Stiglitz (1974) shows that given a risk averse tenant and non-observability or 
costly monitoring of effort, sharecropping might dominate wage contract because of its 
incentive advantage and dominate fixed rental because of its risk pooling advantage. 
On the other hand, according to the transaction cost theory, unobservability of the 
implementation of contractual agreements provides incentives for opportunism on the 
tenant’s part.  The landlord is, therefore, expected to opt for rental contract as a caution 
against this opportunism. The reason is that opportunism includes efforts to evade 
performance, to engage in asset damaging activities, to cheat on input application, and to 
under-report output, all of which impose costs to the landlord (Allen and Lueck, 1995). 
This apparently contradicts the risk sharing theory, which predicts that uncertainty in the 
production environment favours sharecropping due to its optimal alignment of incentives 
and risk.  
While transaction costs with respect to search, screening and monitoring are central 
in the respective arguments, the essential deviation lies in the way the costs are perceived. 
For the agency theorists, moral hazard represents deviation from joint maximizing behavior 
due to the disincentives induced by sharing. Transactions cost theorists, on the other hand, 
see the opportunism to be akin to efforts to gain the maximum out of the distribution of 
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gains or asset abuses (Matssen & Saussier, 2002).  Empirical studies of actual contract 
choice also remain equally inconclusive with some supporting the risk sharing (e.g. Shaban, 
1987) and others supporting transaction costs explanations (e.g. Allen and Leuck, 1999).  
 Recent studies focus on notoriously imperfect credit markets and their resulting 
liquidity implications as additional determinants of contract choice. Tikabo (2003) argues 
that rural communities are characterized by severe credit constraints leading to high 
discount rates. 7  As a result, in order to carry out cash-related transactions in the land lease 
market, tenants (for rent and input contribution) and landlords (for input contribution), 
would have to rely on their individual liquidity. Thus, liquidity constraints and the 
associated discount rates become important determinants of contract choice. 8 In addition, 
in early 19th century Italy, where credit markets were arguably under-developed, Akerberg 
and Botticini (2002) find evidence where poorer tenants matched with better off landlords 
pointing to the role of the land lease markets in relaxing credit constraints. 
 
3.  Empirical setting, data collection and variable description  
The pattern of land ownership and distribution in Ethiopia has largely been shaped by the 
radical Land Reform of 1975 which made all land state property and introduced an 
egalitarian distribution9 of user rights to land based on household size. The two decades 
following the reform were characterized by frequent redistributions in order to adjust 
operational holdings to family size and to accommodate new landless families. Moreover, 
the abolishment of outright land sales that occurred in the 1970s still holds, and until the 
early 1990s, any kind of land rental was prohibited.  
In the study area, redistribution has been generally banned since 1997. Thus, land 
leasing has been the only viable way of accessing land for those who do not own (enough) 
land (Teklu and Lemi, 2004). Similarly, those who have excess (operational) land relative 
                                                 
7 Credit market imperfections make individuals discount consumption at abnormally high rates. Thus discount 
rates could measure the degree of credit market/liquidity constraints (Pender, 1996).  
8 Tikabo (2003) used wealth as a proxy for discount rate.  
9 The land redistribution was generally more effectively egalitarian in the traditionally non-land owning and 
tributary mass of the South than traditionally land-owning mass of the North. Moreover, Kebede (2003) 
argues that some Pre-Land Reform inequalities are considerably carried over to post reform inequalities.  
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to other factors they own have also relied on the land lease market to balance their factor 
endowments in production (Tikabo, 2003).  
An average land holding in the study area is a little more than one hectare. 
Ploughing land of that size takes roughly four oxen days, which creates a huge extra 
demand for land even for a farmer with an average land size and only a pair of oxen. This is 
compounded by landlessness leading to serious land scarcity. Thus, the decision to rent out 
and what contract type to choose is largely determined by the landlord. Since land is scarce, 
landlords generally have the upper hand in setting the terms of the contract. 
However, there could be situations where the landlord is in a weaker bargaining 
position either due to either financial reasons (Bellemare and Barrett, 2003) or to the 
landlord being a female-headed household (Bezabih and Holden, 2006).  
The data contain information on 125 pairs of land lease contracts in East Gojjam, a 
zone in the Amhara National Regional State of Ethiopia. The pairing is based on a sub-
sample of land owners included in the third round of the Ethiopian Environmental 
Household Survey. The survey was conducted during the 2005/06 production year.  
The survey consists of details of socioeconomic characteristics of both landlord and 
tenant households. Contracts contain information on the type of crop, who makes decisions 
and/or contributions on the type of crop, the amount of fertilizer applied, and crop/residue 
sharing rule. In addition to items stipulated in the contract, information on the search 
process, social capital and local market interactions as well as previous contracting 
experiences was collected.  
The observed choice of contractual arrangements is a function of factors that are 
identified in risk sharing and transaction cost theories, and background socioeconomic and 
physical farm characteristics of the household.  As per our hypothesis in Section 1, the 
main determinants of contract choice are the risk preferences and discount rates as well as 
the individual transaction costs of both landlords and tenants. We hypothesize that the 
landlord’s risk preference is negatively related to the increase in the share of output that 
goes to the landlord. The impact of rate of time preferences on the landlord’s choice of 
contract is mixed. On the one hand, poverty and credit market imperfections increase the 
landlord’s desire to have immediate cash and hence increase the tendency to go for rental 
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arrangements, which involve upfront payment. On the other hand, the risk of foregoing 
consumption during the coming year and receiving lower amounts in terms of rent, both of 
which are related to credit market imperfections and high discounting, make rental 
arrangements less attractive. We also hypothesize that a higher search ability of the 
landlord increase the tendency to go for sharing contracts. This is because finding a 
trustworthy tenant with low tendencies to shirk on effort relies on the landlord ability to 
search for such a tenant. 
To the tenant, high risk aversion increases the tendency to go for sharing contracts 
since such contracts lead to sharing output risk. In addition, sharing contracts are more 
likely to be favored by tenants with high rate of time preferences. This is because these 
tenants are likely to be liquidity and credit constrained, and sharing avoids the burden of 
paying cash upfront. Tenants with high search and signaling ability are more likely to go 
for sharing contracts, since the type of tenant is more critical in sharing than rental 
contracts.  
Contractual arrangements are also functions of socioeconomic and physical farm 
characteristics of a farm household, which determine the household’s preferences of one 
form of contract over another. We base our choice of such variables on contractual studies 
(e.g. Tikabo, 2003). Definitions and summary statistics of the variables used in our analysis 
are presented in Tables 1and 2 respectively.  
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Table 1: Variable definitions and descriptions 
Variables Description 
LANDLORD SOCIOECONOMIC & FARM 
Education      
Age 
Female 
Male adult 
Female adult 
Livestock 
Oxen 
Flat slope plot 
Medium slope plot 
Fertile plot 
Medium fertile plot 
Black soil  
Red soil  
Plot size 
Farm size 
Plot distance 
TENANT  
Tenant’s age 
Tenant’s oxen 
RISK&TIME PREFERENCE 
Landlord’s risk  preference 
Landlord’s rate of time preference  
Tenant’s risk  preference 
Tenant’s rate of time preference  
SEARCH &SIGNALING 
Tenant’s access to local factor market 
Landlord’s access to local factor market 
Tenant’s ability to acquire help when needed 
Landlord’s ability to get credit in kind 
Tenant’s commitment to other landlords 
Tenant’s land ownership 
DEPENDENT  
Contract choice 
Lease out 
CHARACTERISTICS 
Head’s formal education (1=read and write; 2= read only; 3=none) 
Age of household head 
Gender of the household head 
The number of male working-age family member of the landlord per ha 
The number of female working-age family member of the landlord per ha 
The number of livestock per ha 
The number of oxen per ha 
Flat slope of the plot (1=flat; 0=not flat) 
Medium slope of the plot (1=medium; 0=not medium) 
Fertile plot (1=fertile; 0=not fertile) 
Medium fertile plot (1=medium fertile; 0=not medium fertile) 
Plot with black soil color (1=black; 0=not black) 
Plot with red soil color (1=red; 0=not red) 
Total farm size (ha) 
Plot size (ha) 
Distance of the plot from homestead (minutes) 
CHARACTERISTICS 
Tenant’s age 
The number of oxen owned by the tenant 
VARIABLES 
An experimental measure of landowner’s risk aversion 
An experimental measure of landowner’s rate of time preference 
An experimental measure of tenant’s risk aversion 
An experimental measure of landowner’s rate of time preference 
VARIABLES 
An index of variables indicating the tenant’s ability to acquire oxen and labor in the local market 
An index of variables indicating the landowner’s ability to acquire oxen and labor in the local market 
A dummy variable indicating tenant’s ability to mobilize free labor and money in case of emergency  
A dummy variable indicating whether the landlord would be able to acquire credit in kind  
A dummy variable indicating whether the tenant has contractual agreements with other landlords  
A dummy variable indicating whether the tenant owns any land of his own 
VARIABLES 
A categorical variable with three levels where 1=rent; 2=pure sharecropping & 3= cost sharing 
A dummy variable indicating whether a plot is leased out or not 
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Table 2: Summary statistics of variables used in the regression 
Variables Mean Std.Dev. Minimum Maximum 
LANDLORD SOCIOECONOMIC & FARM CHARACTERISTICS 
Education 1.403 0.773 1 3 
Female 0.412 0.494 0 1 
Age 55.56 17.57 22 95 
Adult male 1.295 1.341 0 8.6 
Adult female 1.958 1.357 0 7.1 
Livestock 2.879 4.409 0 20.7 
Oxen 1.021 1.837 0 10.8 
Fertile 0.306 0.461 0 1 
Medium fertile 0.362 0.480 0 1 
Black soil  0.264 0.441 0 1 
Red soil  0.555 0.497 0 1 
Flat slope plot 0.545 0.498 0 1 
Medium slope plot 0.257 0.437 0 1 
Plot distance 17.6 71.2 0 900 
Plot size 0.312 0.194 0.003 1.356 
Farm size 2.162 1.099 0.1 4.929 
TENANT CHARACTERISTICS     
Tenant’s age 1.982 0.758 1 3 
Tenant's oxen 2.034 1.118 0 0 
RISK&TIME PREFERENCE MEASURES 
Tenant’s risk  4.32 1.994 1 6 
Tenant’s rate of time preference 0.398 0.183 0.117 0.963 
Landlord’s risk  4.008 2.081 1 6 
Landlord’s rate of time preference 0.364 0.172 0.117 0.963 
SEARCH &SIGNALING 
Tenant’s ability to acquire help when 
needed  
4.823 1.418 1 6 
Tenant’s access to local factor markets 4.700 2.511 1 8 
Landlord’s access to local factor markets 2.857 2.132 0 8 
Landlord’s ability to acquire credit in kind 0.766 0.423 0 1 
Tenant’s commitment to other landlords 0.452 0.498 0 1 
 
Below we present the dependent and independent variables used in the analysis. 
Contract Choice 
The dependent variable is a categorical variable with three levels. The categories 
include pure rent, pure sharecropping and cost sharing. Under rental arrangements, the 
tenant gives the landlord an upfront cash payment for the period of the contract, and all 
input costs are borne by the tenant. The other two are variants of sharecropping, where 
pure sharecropping involves output sharing at the end of the production period. In 
addition, under sharecropping, inputs like fertilizer and seed are fully contributed by the 
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tenant. Likewise cost sharing arrangements involve end-of-period output sharing. But 
under cost sharing, the landlord contributes to inputs like seeds and fertilizer. 1 
Household socioeconomic and physical farm characteristics  
Socioeconomic variables include the household head’s age and level of education, and 
oxen ownership for both the landlords and the tenants.  In addition wealth and labor 
availability measures were included for the landlords. Plot-level fertility, slope, and soil 
type, for plots owned by the landlords are also included as physical farm variables. 
Search ability  
Since it is difficult to get an ideal measure of search ability for the landlord and the 
tenant, we use proxies as measures. In particular, we chose the household’s access to 
other (parallel) local factor markets as one measure of search ability. This variable is 
constructed by aggregating the household’s participation in the local markets. 
Households were asked whether they would be able to rent in/out oxen, hire in/out 
agricultural labor and borrow/lend grains when needed. The yes/ no answers were 
aggregated to form an index measuring the household’s access to the local factor 
markets. Another measure of search ability that we used is the ability to access help 
upon emergency which is measured as a dummy variable.  
Signaling ability 
 Because of the difficulty to objectively measure signaling ability, we opted for proxies. 
One is whether the tenant has signed a contract with other landlord(s). The rationale for 
choosing this as a measure of signaling ability is that it indicates the tenant’s reputation 
as a good farmer. The other measure of signaling ability used is the tenant’s land 
ownership since landless tenants will generally be less experienced with farming 
activity. 
 
Rate of time preferences and risk aversion 
The time preference experiment was set up following Pender (1996). The experiment 
was described to households as a hypothetical game consisting of six choice sets. In 
                                                 
1 Sometimes pure sharecropping involves an upfront fixed payment in addition to output sharing at the 
end of the production period. The upfront payment in this case is usually repaid later (upon harvest or 
when the landlord gives cash) or in some cases it is never repaid. As per our discussion with some of the 
respondents, we got the impression that non-repayable upfront payments were given to households with 
good plots while repayable upfront payments were given as an interlinked credit arrangement for cash-
stressed households.  
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each choice set, the households were offered a choice between a specific amount of 
money to be received the same day and an alternative amount to be received on an 
alternative future date. The choice sets were arranged in such a way that the gap 
between the amounts to be received the same day and an alternative amount to be 
received on an alternative future date were randomly sequenced. All choice sets offered 
choices between Br. 502 to be received the same day and an amount ranging from Br. 65 
to Br. 195 to be received on the same day next year. The choice set with the smallest 
difference was given by an early reward of Br. 50 and a later reward of Br. 65. The 
choice set with the largest difference was given by an early reward of Br. 50 and a later 
reward of Br. 195.  The range of rate of time preference was inferred when the 
respondent crossed over from preference for an early reward to preference for a later 
reward. The obtained response was used to compute an interval measure of rate of time 
preference for each respondent. The structure of the rate of time preference experiment 
is presented in Appendix 1. 
The risk preference experiment was set up following Yesuf (2004), where the 
standard risk preference experiment is modified to fit into the real life experiences of 
farmer choosing between alternative levels of agricultural yields. The experiment was 
also described to the households as a hypothetical game consisting of six choice sets. 
Each choice represented two alternative farming systems with identical costs but with 
different output levels. The realization of each outcome/each farming system carried a 
50% probability of a good or a bad harvest. For each outcome, the expected gains are 
calculated as the average of the good and bad harvest, while the spreads are calculated 
as the differences between the good and bad harvest. The choice sets were arranged in a 
tree structure where the choice made in the first choice set determines whether one 
branches into more/ less risky choice alternatives. A bad harvest ranged from 0kg 
output to 100kg output while a good harvest ranged between 100kg to 400kg. The 
expected gain from a combination of bad-good harvest outcomes ranged from 100 to 
200kg, while the spread ranged between 0 and 400kg. An extreme outcome consisted of 
an expected gain of 100kg and a spread of 0kg, while a neutral outcome consisted of an 
expected gain of 200kg and a spread of 400kg.  Accordingly, the households were 
subjected to one choice at a time, in order to determine their risk preferences. The 
                                                 
2 Br. is the Ethiopian currency and USD. 1 is equivalent to about Br. 8.6.   
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obtained response was used to compute an interval measure of risk preference for each 
respondent. The structure of the risk preference experiment is given in Appendix 2. 
Table 3 presents a summary of the main variables with the expected signs.  
 
Table 3: Variable relationships and expected signs 
Dependent  Explanatory Expected sign 
Contract choice Landlord Variables  
Risk preference 
Rate of time preference 
Access to local factor market 
Ability to acquire help when needed 
- 
+/- 
+/- 
+/- 
 
Tenant Variables   
 
Pure rent=1 
Pure sharecropping=2 
Cost sharing=3 
 
Risk preference 
Rate of time preference 
Access to local factor market 
Ability to acquire help when needed 
+ 
- 
+/- 
+/- 
 
4. Empirical Specification  
Households make contract choices on plots they are leasing out. Since plots that are 
leased out are likely to be systematically different from plots that are not leased out, the 
possible selection bias needs to be addressed for proper analysis of the determinants of 
contract choice. To that effect, the following selection equation is specified:  
1 * * 0,
0i
if dem farm u
P
otherwise
α γ µ+ + + >⎧= ⎨⎩                (1) 
where iP is a binary variable which takes the value one if the plot is leased out and zero 
if the plot is managed by the landlord him/herself, dem is the  vector of socioeconomic 
variables of the landlord, farm is the vector of physical farm characteristics of the 
landlord, , &α γ µ  are coefficients, and u is the error term. The contract choice 
equation is given by:  
* * * * * * *Contract dem farm tcxs risk rtp search SIGω β θ ι γ λ ϑ ψ υ= + + + + + + + +   (2) 
where contract stands for 
1:
2 :
3 :
rent
pure sharecropping
costsharing
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
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tcxs   is  the vector of socioeconomic and physical farm characteristics of the tenant, risk 
is risk aversion variables for the landowner and the tenant, rtp stands for rate of time 
preference variables for the landowner and the tenant, search stands for the vector of 
search ability variables for the landowner and the tenant, sig stands for the variable 
measuring the signaling ability of the tenant, , , , , , &ω β γ λ ϑ ι ψ  are coefficients, and v 
is the error term. 
As we argued in Section 3, when we go from rental contracts to pure 
sharecropping and cost sharing, then the tenant’s output share and output risk decrease 
and vice versa. Given this and following Tikabo (2003), we opt for an ordered probit 
model of contract choice. To address the selection bias, we follow Heckman (1979) and 
employ Heckman’s two-stage estimation.  
According to Heckman’s specification, the error terms, u and v are assumed to 
follow a bivariate normal distribution where ~ (0,1)v N and ( / )E u v vγ= ; γ  is a 
constant and where 0γ =  indicates that u and v are uncorrelated.  For non-zero γ  
values, u and v are correlated and the following relationship holds:  
1 2 2 1 1 1 2 2
1 1 1 2 2
( | , ) ( | , )
( , )
E y x y x E v x y
x h x y
β γ
β γ
= +
= +       (3) 
where 1x , 1y 2 2,x y represent the independent and dependent variables in 
equations (1) and (2) respectively. Since 2 2 2 2( , ) ( | ) ( )h x y E v v x xδ λ δ= > − =  where 
(.) (.) (.)λ φ≡ Φ is the inverse Mill’s ratio, the estimable form of equation (3) could be 
equivalently written as:  
1 2 2 1 1 1 2( | , 1) ( )E y x y x xβ γ λ δ= +       (4) 
The procedure estimates equation (1), which is the leasing decision equation in 
the first stage. The second stage in this estimation procedure is the ordered probit 
equation of contract choice that incorporates the inverse Mills ratio as a correcting term. 
5. Results 
We present the results from Heckman’s two-stage estimation of the determinants of 
contract choice in Table 4. The first stage represents selection equation for the lease 
status of the plot and in the second stage ordered probit model of contract choice is 
estimated. 
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In the contract choice estimation, the rate of time preference for the tenant is not 
significant while that of the landlord is positive and significant, which indicates that 
landlords with higher discount rates tend to go for more sharing. The risk measure is 
also not significant neither for the tenant nor for the landlord. This indicates that there is 
no support for the risk-sharing hypothesis.  
  Tenant’s current engagement with other landlord(s), which we used as a 
measure of tenant signaling ability, is significant and negative, indicating that tenants 
with more landlord(s) than the current landlord are likely to get more incentive-
contracts like rent. Tenant and landlord ability to get help when needed, and access to 
local factor markets, which we used as proxies for landlord and tenant search ability are 
insignificant. Although the transaction costs measures are mainly insignificant, the fact 
that tenant characteristics are significant may indicate that those pick up the effects of 
transaction costs.  
Many of the socio-economic and physical farm characteristics of the landlord 
are not significant. However, households with more educated heads are significantly 
less likely to go for sharing contracts. This could be because more educated households 
might be going to school and thus have less time for farming activities, which may 
make less sharing easier both in terms of possible labor contribution as well as 
supervision. In addition, more fertile plots are likely to be leased out under sharing 
arrangements. This could be due to the landlord’s strategy to reduce asset abuse by the 
tenant, and is in line with the finding by Dubois (2002).  
Older tenants are more likely to go for sharing contracts probably due to the 
possibility of getting labor help from landlords. On the other hand, tenants with more 
oxen are likely to go for less sharing contracts. This result may be due to the high 
correlation of wealth and liquidity with oxen ownership and hence oxen ownership 
might be picking up the effects of discount rate on contract choice.3  
A further assessment of our results indicates that there is a tendency for 
landlords and tenants to match along certain characteristics.  Particularly, the results 
show that landlords with a high rate of time preferences and less wealthy tenants tend to 
go for sharing contracts. This indicates that the land lease market is a mechanism for 
                                                 
3 Higher discount rates are associated with lower oxen ownership and vice versa (Yesuf, 2004). 
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poor tenants and landlords to pool resources together for production. Similarly, 
wealthier tenants/landlords go for less sharing contracts.  
The lease-out selection equation results show systematic differences between 
leased and non-leased plots, which is in line with Dubois (2002) who also found similar 
selection biases in the decision to lease out. Many of the physical plot characteristics are 
insignificant except for larger size plots, which are significantly more likely to be leased 
out. This may be a strategy by landlord households who are oxen and labor constrained: 
to keep and manage smaller plots more efficiently but to lease out bigger plots to 
relatively more oxen and/or labor endowed tenants. The household head’s levels of 
education and per hectare oxen and livestock ownership are not significant determinants 
of leasing out. Households headed by a female or those with more adult male family 
members are more likely to rent out their land.  
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Table 4: Heckman's two-stage estimates of determinants of contract choice 
  Contract choice equation Lease out equation 
 
Dep. Variable :        1=rent; 
       2=pure sharecropping; 
       3=cost sharing  
Landlord characteristics coefficient Std.err. coefficient Std.err. 
Plot size 0.936    0.834 1.604***  0.320 
Farm size -0.138  0.092 -0.159  0.037 
Livestock 0.003  0.037 -0.001  0.034 
Oxen 0.081  0.099 -0.013  0.081 
Male adult -0.380**  0.166 0.181**  0.063 
Female adult 0.553**  0.132 -0.093  0.061 
Female -0.118  0.202 0.321**  0.158 
Age  -0.002  0.005 0.001  0.003 
Education -0.268*  0.136 -0.025  0.084 
Fertile plot 0.485**  0.212 -0.066  0.162 
Medium fertile plot 0.190  0.197 -0.060  0.158 
Black soil 0.311  0.345 0.025  0.077 
Red soil 0.119  0.337 -0.034  0.158 
Flat slope plot -0.119  0.236 0.232  0.282 
Moderate slope plot -0.389  0.239 0.243  0.253 
Plot distance    -0.008  0.005 
Tenure security -0.191  0.134   
Tenant characteristics     
Tenant’s age -0.018** 0.007   
Tenant’s oxen -0.222**  0.095   
Rate of time preference and risk     
Landlord’s rate of time preference 0.732*  0.396   
Landlord’s risk 0.017  0.069   
Tenant’s risk -0.076  0.067   
Tenant’s rate of time preference 0.256  0.428   
Search and screening     
Tenant’s ability to acquire favour in need 0.109  0.074   
Tenant’s access to local factor market -0.037  0.045   
Landlord’s ability to get informal credit 0.267  0.198   
Landlord’s access to local factor market 0.032  0.049   
Tenant’s commitment to other landlords -0.403**  0.207   
Tenant’s land ownership -0.303  0.249   
Constant 0.936  0.834 0.431  0.951 
Inverse Mill’s Ratio 1.988  .0003***   
Number of Obervations (609)  396 609  
Standard errors in Parentheses : * significant at 10%,  ** significant at 5%,  ***significant at 1% 
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6. Conclusions 
Our interest here is in trying to see if landlord-tenant characteristics with respect to risk 
sharing, discount rates and transaction cost in the land lease market influence contract 
choice. Based on the explanations from the agency and transaction cost theories, and 
complementary market imperfections that characterize rural factor markets, we expect 
that transaction costs, risk and rate of time preference are important and simultaneous 
determinants of contract choice. 
We employ data from the Central-Western Highlands of Ethiopia that consists of 
information on contractual arrangements and socioeconomic and physical farm 
characteristics of landlords and matching tenants. Risk and time preferences and search 
abilities for both land owners and tenants, and tenant’s signaling ability as well as 
relevant demographic information are used. 
The results show that tenant characteristics are more important in explaining 
contract choice than those of landlords. Landlord rate of time preference is a significant 
determinant of contract choice indicating that credit constraints matter. However, risk 
preferences are not significant for tenants or landlords. Hence, the risk-sharing 
hypothesis of the agency theory as a motivation for contract choice while there is some 
support that discount rates and transaction cost considerations affect contract choice.  
In addition, the results from the binary lease out decision equation indicate that 
landlords make the decision to lease out based on certain considerations. Our finding 
that plots with bigger sizes are likely to be rented out might be associated with the 
inverse farm-size productivity results that are consistently found across smallholder 
agricultural efficiency studies. If owner-operators manage smaller plots, to the extent 
that tenants manage leased-in plots less efficiently, then landlords with bigger leased out 
plots may be the ones with overall farm inefficiency. Further studies that look into such 
links could lead to a better understanding of farm size-efficiency relationships. 
Consistent with expectations, female headed households are also more likely to rent out.   
One important implication of the results is that there is a tendency for landlords 
and tenants to match along certain characteristics. Particularly, our results indicate that 
the land lease market serves as a resource pooling mechanism by bringing together poor 
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landlords and tenants into sharing arrangements. Further studies are needed to examine 
the characteristics of landlords and tenants that are matched by assessing leasing in/out 
decisions directly. 
While our study is one of the few land lease market studies that include 
matching of landlords and tenants, our sample is based on landlords and tenants who are 
currently observed in the market. It does not include potential tenants and landlords who 
do not currently take part in the land lease market but who are possibly screened out due 
to constraints faced in the land lease market.  Future studies that include such 
information could illuminate our understanding of agricultural contract choice and the 
workings of the rural land lease market at large.  
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Appendix  
Appendix 1: The time preference experiment  
We would like to ask you questions regarding how you feel about money today 
compared to money exactly one year from now. Imagine that you can choose between 
receiving 50 ETB today or a larger sum one year from now. Which would you choose?  
 
    
Choice set1 
 
 
50 ETB Now Or 65 ETB after 12 months 
Choice set2  
 
 
50 ETB Now Or 105 ETB after 12 months 
Choice set3 
 
 
50 ETB Now Or 195 ETB after 12 months 
Choice set4 
 
 
50 ETB Now Or 80 ETB after 12 months 
Choice set5 
 
 
50 ETB Now Or 160 ETB after 12 months 
Choice set6 
 
 
50 ETB Now Or 130 ETB after 12 months 
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Appendix 2: The risk preference experiment 
We would now like to know how you would choose between different agricultural plots with different characteristics. Imagine that you 
have two plots. The production on the plots differ depending on if the rains are good or bad. There are equal chances (50%) of good or bad 
rains.  
 
 WHICH OF THESE PLOTS WOULD YOU LIKE TO HAVE? 
   1.a  1.b 
 
 
 
  or 
 
  
 
THEN IMAGINE THAT YOU CAN CHOOSE BETWEEN TWO OTHER PLOTS 
 
IF LEFT CHOICE (1.A) THEN ASK         IF RIGHT CHOICE(1.B) THEN ASK 
              2.a          2.b     3.a 3.b 
 
 
 
  or 
 or 
 
 
 
THEN IMAGINE THAT YOU CAN CHOOSE BETWEEN TWO OTHER PLOTS 
 
 IF RIGHT CHOICE (2.b) THEN ASK IF LEFT CHOICE (3.A) THEN ASK  
 4.a    4.b    5.a   5.b    
 
  
 OR OR
Bad harvest 
20ETB
Good harvest 
380ETB 
Bad harvest 
 
80ETB
Good harvest 
240ETB 
Bad harvest 
90ETB 
Good harvest 
180ETB 
Bad harvest 
60ETB 
Good harvest 
300ETB 
Bad harvest 
100ETB
Good harvest 
100ETB 
Bad harvest 
0ETB
Good harvest 
400ETB 
Bad harvest 
90ETB
Good harvest 
180ETB 
Bad harvest 
80ETB
Good harvest 
180ETB 
Bad harvest 
60ETB
Good harvest 
300ETB 
Bad harvest 
20ETB
Good harvest 
380ETB 
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Abstract 
The study is an empirical investigation of agrobiodiversity conservation decisions of 
small farmers in the central highlands of Ethiopia. The primary objective is to measure 
the effectiveness of Community Seed Banking (CSB) in enhancing diversity while 
providing productivity incentives. Our results indicate a significant impact of 
participation in CSB on farm-level agrobiodiversity. However, the level biodiversity 
conservation was not found to have the expected reinforcing impact on participation 
indicating no support for simultaneity. CSB participation also led to increase in 
productivity consistent with the need for such incentives to enhance diversity at a farm 
level. Our assessment of the performance of the GLS estimator yielded a significant 
discrepancy between the GLS and bootstrap estimates. This led to the conclusion that 
bootstrapping asymptotic estimations might be required for appropriate inference. 
 
JEL classification: C35, Q12, Q29 
Key words: Agrobiodiversity; Seed system imperfection; Amemiya’s GLS; 
Bootstrapping 
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1. Introduction 
The provision of public goods is commonly financed by taxation or subsidies to private 
expenditure or action (Roberts, 1987). However, in poor developing countries, imposing 
taxes on individuals based on the ‘polluter pay principle’ may be questionable, as it 
would enhance poverty (Holden et al., 2005).  On the other hand, state subsidy is, in 
many cases, justified for a very narrow range of public goods due to priority reasons.  In 
cases where the goods do not fall into this range, one way of ensuring their provision is 
through exploiting possible synergies between private incentives and public good 
generation (e.g. Lamb, 2002).   
In line with this, the study focuses on agrobiodiversity1 as a quasi-public good 
and assesses possible synergies between improvement in the working of the local seed 
system, and its conservation. Since the provision of agrobiodiversity is largely in-situ2, 
the level of conservation is highly dependent on individual farmers’ decisions. Under 
the condition of imperfectly working seed system, an easy-access seed source will 
provide incentives for adoption of seeds from the particular source. If the farmer’s 
decision is such that the seeds adopted add to the existing seed portfolio, farm-level 
diversity will be enhanced.  
The aim of the paper is to assess the potential of a scheme called Community 
Seed Banking (CSB), which intends to correct for imperfections in the local seed 
system by availing easy access to local seeds, and to enhance farm level 
agrobiodiversity (Lewis and Mulvany, 1997; Demissie and Tanto, 2000). The efficacy 
of CSB is based on two premises. One is that the CSB seed system expands the 
availability of local varieties to individual farmers, and therefore, increases diversity. 
The other premise is that given imperfections in the already existing seed system, the 
provision of seed varieties would ease constraints to seed access. In turn, this would 
lead to improved resource allocation and increased productivity. However, for the 
increase in productivity to be realised, the varieties need not be inherently more 
productive than the other available varieties; the productivity increase comes about 
                                                 
1 The component of biodiversity that contributes to food and agriculture production (European 
Environmental Agency, 2005). 
2 In situ conservation is the conservation of ecosystems and natural habitats and the maintenance and 
recovery of viable population and species in their natural surrounding or in surroundings where they have 
developed their distinctive properties (UNEP, 1994).    
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because of improvement in access to seeds and the resulting improvement in the 
allocation of resources. 
Based on this, we set out to investigate the role of CSB in enhancing 
agrobiodiversity and in increasing farm-level productivity. We hypothesize that CSB 
participation will have a positive impact on biodiversity. Also, its impact on 
productivity will be positive. 
Previous studies analyzing participation in agri-environmental schemes looked 
into farmer (e.g. Wilson, 1997) and scheme factors (e.g. Vanslembrouk et al., 2002) as 
important determinants of the decision to participate and of the degree of participation. 
In addition, other aspects not captured by ‘farmer’ and ‘scheme’ factors are also 
indicated to be important in explaining participation in such programmes. Wossink and 
van Wenum (2003) found that perception of environmental risks is an important 
additional reason to participate in agri-environmental schemes. In their analysis of the 
determinants of participation in unsprayed crop edges program in the Netherlands, Van 
der Muleun et al. (1996) found that perceptions regarding the environment significantly 
differ between participants and non-participants.  
In the case of CSB intervention, we argue that in addition to ‘farmer’, ‘scheme’, 
and other behavioral factors, previous knowledge and experience in managing 
biodiversity affect participation in CSB. Since knowledge and experience in managing 
biodiversity are directly related with the level of diversity, this implies that diversity 
will be a determinant of participation. This, together with our main hypothesis that 
participation is a determinant of diversity, implies that there is simultaneity between 
diversity and participation. Thus, assessment of the impact of CSB on agrobiodiversity 
requires a simultaneous estimation of an equation system with participation and 
biodiversity measures as endogenous variables.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present 
description of seed systems and the mechanisms by which CSB would work to enhance 
diversity and increase productivity. Section 3 follows with a description of the setting 
and sampling procedure. Section 4 presents the econometric model and estimation 
techniques. The results and discussion are presented in section 5. Section 6 concludes 
the paper. 
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2. CSB, Seed System Imperfection and Agrobiodiversity  
In poor, smallholder agriculture, a number of seed sources comprise the seed system 
which farmers access planting materials from. These include savings from own harvest, 
farmer-farmer exchange/borrowing, purchases from the local market, provision via 
projects and NGOs, other informal seed sources, as well as distribution of seeds via 
national seed distribution programs, which are present in many developing countries. At 
the village level, most farmers consistently obtain seeds from own harvest, from 
neighbors and from village markets (Ndjeunga, 2002). In addition, in Mexico, for 
instance, farmer-farmer seed exchange is highly frequent both in terms of modern and 
traditional varieties (Rice and Smale, 1998).  
If farmers have to rely on own-source, they would have to save from previous 
harvests. In poor, subsistence agriculture, this would entail that only those capable of 
saving from previous harvests could access planting materials from own-harvest. In 
addition such seed sources are characterized by storage problems associated with pest 
infestations and deterioration in seed quality (Lewis and Mulvany, 1997). Seed 
exchange and borrowing among farmers also tends to have limited scope. According to 
Sperling et al. (1996) the seed diffusion among farmers happens within a narrow social 
circle–not every one who asks for seed obtains it and seeds targeted for stressful 
environments move more slowly than highly productive seeds 
Another component of the seed system is the formal/modern component, which 
is either under national seed distribution programs or the private seed multiplication and 
distribution sector. The coverage of public sector seed schemes has been very low either 
due to ill-implementations or structural adoption problems. There has also been little 
interest in multiplying and distributing seed by the private sector since there is limited 
market potential. A combination of poor public sector performance and lack of private 
sector interest makes formal seed systems less reliable sources of seed (Ndjeunga, 
2002). In addition, the modern component of the seed system is also characterized by 
positive transaction costs to access, indicated by factors like costly supplementary 
inputs, costly experimentation, seasonal liquidity and family labour constraints (Moser 
and Barrett, 2003).  
Imperfections in both the traditional/informal and the modern seed sources 
constitute positive transaction costs in the already existing seed system, which leaves 
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room for improvement in terms of provision of a relatively easily accessible source. 
Given this, projects/programs with objectives of increasing seed materials to farmers 
through farmer participatory methods could be one way of availing seeds that are 
desired by and affordable to farmers.  
CSB is a scheme, which aims at improving the working of the existing seed 
system by availing easy-access seeds. The scheme is part of the Global Environment 
Facility initiative to strengthen in situ conservation of farmers’ traditional landraces 
with their natural competitors such as pests, predators, and pathogens together with the 
associated farmers’ traditional knowledge on these landraces which can be instrumental 
in utilization and development of new crop varieties from farmers original landraces. 
Through a method of establishing community seed banks, the project links farm 
communities and their landraces with the existing genetic resource conservation efforts 
of central Gene Banks (Demissie and Tanto, 2000).   
The scheme involves identification, collection, multiplication, storage and 
distribution of local seeds. Farmer groups engage in the task of identifying local 
varieties that are desired by farmers. The selection criteria are based on the local 
availability and distribution of the identified variety, availability of the variety in other 
localities or in the central gene bank and assessment of the individual farmer’s demand 
for it. The selected varieties will be collected and multiplied on rented plots and stored 
in the CSB storehouse. Participants can borrow local seeds of available types and 
amounts. Participants are also entitled to interest on deposited seeds (Demissie and 
Tanto, 2000).  
In our study, the main source of CSB varieties is the central gene bank of the 
Institute of Biodiversity Conservation and Research. Another source of CSB seeds is 
deposit and storage by CSB participants. The varieties from CSB will be of such a 
nature that they are either currently planted by some farmers but others do not have 
access to them or they are varieties that are not currently planted by farmers in the 
locality but are either available in other localities or in the central gene bank (Lewis and 
Mulvany, 1997).  
While participation might include attending trainings, farmer-days, taking part in 
on farm seed multiplication, seed selection, seed collection, seed storage and borrowing 
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seed, we only focus on borrowing seed. We also refer as participants only those who 
were engaged in borrowing seeds during the period of the data collection.  
By increasing the availability of local seeds to farmers, CSB facilitates easier 
seed flow among farmers, thereby widening their varietal choice. It also expands the 
variety basket available at the village level since CSB varieties could originate from 
other localities or the central gene bank storage. In addition, CSB provides farmers with 
modern storages, which give the seeds longer shelf life and better protection against 
pests and diseases.  
Thus, provision of CSB seeds would increase productivity given the 
imperfections in the already existing seed system. In line with this we hypothesize CSB 
to be a seed source, which improves the already existing seed system, thereby 
enhancing productivity.  
Since CSB seeds are local varieties, there are reasons to believe that their 
adoption could lead to increased farm-level diversity. Within-farm heterogeneity with 
respect to physical farm characteristics is one reason. Given appropriate combinations, 
planting a diverse set of varieties would lead to higher overall productivity. Particularly, 
local varieties do well on marginal fields. In line with this, Meng et al. (1998b) found 
that households managing farms with diverse characteristics tend to grow more landrace 
varieties.  
Another reason for the association between local varieties and diversity could be 
the transaction costs of accessing varieties with particular qualities. Smale (1995) noted 
that Malawian maize farmers tend to grow local varieties for quality reasons (since the 
local maize varieties have superior consumption qualities) and especially because it is 
not certain that the particular local varieties will be available in the market. Thus, 
households who face higher transaction costs of accessing a wide range of varieties tend 
to diversify production. This is in line with Meng et al. (1998b) observation that quality 
issues become relatively unimportant for households that have given up traditional 
varieties, while high transaction costs of obtaining desired qualities in a particular 
variety contribute to the continued cultivation of landrace varieties.  
In sum, we hypothesize that CSB would relax seed access constraints and 
increase productivity. In addition, since CSB provides local varieties, it contributes to 
increased farm-level biodiversity. 
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3. Setting, Sampling Procedure and Data Used 
The study was conducted in an area within the broad agro ecological zonation of 
Ethiopia known as the Central Highlands in May 2004. The study site is Chefedonsa, a 
woreda3 with 30 kebeles, located in the Eastern Oromiya Zone of the Oromiya National 
Regional State. The site is a center of origin and diversity for many wheat and pulse 
varieties. Therefore, one of the eleven community seed banks across the country is 
located in the woreda. Agroecologically, the study area has a good agricultural potential 
and is located on a plateau as high as 2800m above sea level, which makes it frost 
prone. Main produces include durum and bread wheat, teff4 and pulses.  
The CSB is located in the southeast corner of the woreda. While the scheme 
targets twelve of the thirty kebeles in the Woreda, we only focused on six of them. The 
reason is that the other six had too few participants which, according to the staff 
managing the Bank, could be due to lack of participation in farmer days, training days 
or lack of informal information flow. Using a stratified random sampling, where the 
proportion of the population in each of the six kebeles are used as strata, a sample of 
381 households were interviewed.  
The dependent variables in our analysis are participation in the CSB, diversity in 
crop choice and the level of productivity. Participation is a dichotomously observed 
variable representing whether or not the respondent household has borrowed seeds from 
the CSB in the current production year.  
Diversity is measured by the Shannon index5  as iiD αα ln∑−= , where iα is 
the share of area occupied by the ith crop variety in a household. Following Rice and 
Smale (1998), we refer to a variety as a crop population as recognized and named by 
farmers. Traditional varieties are those that are selected and maintained by farmers 
while modern/improved varieties are those varieties which are developed by the 
                                                 
3 Woreda corresponds to a district while kebele corresponds to a village. 
4 Teff is a cereal with tiny grains and is used for making Injera, a staple for Ethiopians. 
5 Since diversity has many dimensions, a number of measures have been used to represent it. In this study, 
we started by using two measures: the count (representing richness) and Shannon indices (representing 
richness and relative abundance). However, since the results were similar, we opted to report the results 
based on the Shannon index. 
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international or national plant breeding programs. Both traditional and modern varieties 
are included in the diversity index.  Our analysis included eight types of crops and their 
varieties. For details on crops and varieties included in the analysis, see table 1. 
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Table1: Varieties Planted by Households by Crop Category 
Crop type   
Wheat  Teff Peas Lentil Barley Chickpea Beans Vetch All crops 
Total Number of varieties 37 29 21 14 5 10 6 5 127 
Average number of varieties planted per household 2.31 0.64 0.75 0.24 0.02 0.29 0.07 0.16 4.58 
Standard Deviation 1.06 0.69 0.57 0.49 0.16 0.47 0.26 0.38 1.91 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Maximum 8 3 3 3 1 2 2 2 14 
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Commonly used farm level-diversity measures are based on inter-specific and 
infra specific concepts. Inter-specific diversity is the diversity among crop species, 
while infra-specific diversity is the repertoire of varieties of a crop that farmers grow 
simultaneously (Bellon, 1996). While both concepts diversity are widely used in the 
agrobiodiversity literature, we found the concepts less suitable for our purpose for the 
following reasons.  
Using interspecific diversity to assess the impact of participation in CSB  as a 
measure of household level diversity could underestimate the impact of participation on 
diversity. For instance, the diversity of a household who is already growing a wheat 
variety and who has adopted another CSB wheat variety will be underestimated in this 
case since both wheat varieties belong to the same crop category. This way, it will be a 
significant proportion of the households whose farm-level diversity will be 
underestimated (and the impact of participation in CSB as well) since around 51% of 
the plots are planted with wheat varieties. 
Focusing on infraspecific diversity also has its own limitations. Analyzing the 
impact of CSB on based on infraspecific diversity would limit the analysis to 
households growing the crops that the CSB varieties are included in. This might 
overestimate the impact of CSB on diversity if the households excluded are diverse 
households than the ones included and vice versa.  
Given this, we follow the argument by Meng et al. (1998a) that the 
appropriateness of the concept that is chosen is largely a function of the objectives of 
the study and of the level at which the analysis takes place. Accordingly, we construct 
our diversity measure based on a variety as a unit, disregarding whether the particular 
variety belongs in the same crop category as the other variety(ies) or in a different crop 
category. For instance, a household growing three wheat varieties and two teff varities 
will be considered as growing five varieties. Based on this diversity concept, an average 
of 4.58 varieties is grown per household, the most diverse household growing 14 
varieties and the least diverse just one. 
Wheat is the most widely grown crop covering (51%) of the total number of 
plots.  Teff is the next most widely grown crop followed by pulses and other cereals, 
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which represent smaller proportion of the total number of plots compared to the two 
crops.   
The third dependent variable in our analysis, productivity is defined as the value 
of output per hectare. The value of output is calculated by multiplying output (in kg.)  
from each plot with the corresponding price per kg. By summing the output values from 
each plot, the farm-level output is obtained. The ratio of farm level output to farm size 
(in ha.) gave the value of output per ha.  
The price for the different varieties was collected from three sources. The main 
source of price information was the local market. We also had price information for  all 
varieties reported by the households. The price information for varieties not available in 
the local market was filled in with the household- reported price information. For those 
that were not reported by the household, we used the average price of the crop by 
averaging the price of all the varieties within the crop. Although that might not correctly 
measure the value of the variety, we found that to be the least biased way of doing so. 
Socio-economic and physical farm characteristics are among the variables that 
are included in the participation, diversity and productivity equations. Specifically, we 
consider age, gender of the household head, and whether the household head has 
attended any religious or formal education as important measures of demographic 
characteristics in the participation equation. We also include livestock ownership, 
converted into the number of tropical livestock units, as a proxy for wealth1. Radio 
ownership and whether the head received any training during the year, are included as 
measures of access to information.  
Location of the CSB, measured by distance from homestead to town, is included 
in the participation equation as a feature of the CSB. Access to improved seed and 
fertilizer as well as other sources of seed are included as seed system characteristics. 
The diversity equation also includes kebele dummies, intended to capture factors 
that systematically differ across kebeles and that are left uncaptured by any of the 
variables used at the household level. One set of such factors concerns agro ecological 
conditions which include general soil fertility conditions, precipitation, temperature, 
                                                 
1 Endogeneity between variety choice and livestock could be possible since the choice of certain local 
varieties might depend on the quality and quantity of crop residue that is used as animal fodder. However, 
since our diversity index includes both improved and local varities, the effect of endogeneity is likely not 
to be strong. 
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elevation, disease, pest/frost incidence and the like. Market access and transaction cost 
comprise another set of factors that could systematically vary across villages (kebeles).   
In the productivity equation we have the different sources of seeds as 
explanatory variables. In addition, we include age, gender of the household head, wealth 
and oxen ownership as socioeconomic characteristics. The categories of physical farm 
and agroecological variables included in the diversity equation are included in the 
productivity equation.  
Table 2 contains descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis.  
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of the Variables used in the Regressions 
Variables Description Mean Standard 
deviation 
SOCIOECONOMIC  
TRAINING        
WEALTH     
OXEN        
AGE        
FEMALE      
RADIO        
FORMAL EDUCATION 
RELIGIOUS EDUCATION 
 
SCHEME  
LOCATION OF CSB      
  
 
PHYSICAL FARM        
FARM SIZE 
FLAT LAND 
MEDIUM SLOPE 
STEEP SLOPE 
FERTILE 
MODERATELY FERTILE 
INFERTILE 
AGROECOLOGICAL  
GORO        
ADDADI GOLE         
BUAE TENGEGO         
KERSA   
MENJIKSO      
KOREMTA        
SEED SYSTEM  
IMPROVED SEED 
 
FERTILIZER       
 
SEED SOURCE     
 
OWN SEED 
 
CSB SEED 
BORROWED SEED 
EXCHANGED SEED 
 
EXTENSION SEED 
MARKET SEED 
 
DEPENDENT 
PARTICIPATION   
SHANON  
YIELD 
VARIABLES  
Head with any training (1=yes; 0=otherwise) 
Livestock holdings (in tropical livestock unit) 
Number of oxen 
Age of the household head 
Sex of household head (1=female; 0=male) 
Radio ownership (1=yes; 0=otherwise) 
Head’s formal education (1=yes; 0=otherwise) 
Head’s religious education (1=yes; 
0=otherwise) 
VARIABLE 
Location of the Bank (measured in terms of 
Distance from homestead to the Bank 
(minutes) 
VARIBLES 
Farm size (ha) 
Proportion of flat land in the total farm area 
Proportion of hilly land in the total farm area 
Proportion of gorgy land in the total farm area 
Proportion of land with good fertility 
Proportion of land with moderate fertility 
Proportion of infertile land 
VARIABLES 
Kebele dummy (1=Goro) 
Kebele dummy (1=Addadi Gole) 
Kebele dummy (1=Buae Tengego) 
Kebele dummy (1=Kersa) 
Kebele dummy (1=Menjikso) 
Kebele dummy (1=Koremta) 
VARIABLES 
Amount of improved seeds purchased on 
credit in year 2003 (kg) 
Amount of modern fertilizer purchased on 
credit year 2003 (kg) 
Number of sources a household has secured 
seeds from (both traditional and modern) 
Proportion seeds from own storage in the total 
farm 
Proportion seeds from CSB in the total farm 
Proportion seeds borrowed from farmers 
proportion seeds exchanged with fellow 
farmers 
Proportion seeds from the extension system 
Proportion seeds from the market 
 
VARIABLES 
Participation in CSB (1=yes;0=otherwise) 
Richness measured in terms of Shannon index 
Value of total yield per ha (Br2/ha) 
 
.234       
6.748      
2.495      
45.45      
0.029       
0.567     
0.076  
0.389       
 
 
73.744     
 
 
 
2.115       
0.761 
0.117  
0.119    
0.537 
0.217      
0.243 
 
0.297 
0.241       
0.122       
0.082   
0.161 
0.090       
 
26.82       
 
234 
 
1.339       
 
.216      
 
 .072      
.040   
0.016     
 
0.217  
0.437    
 
  
0.271     
 1.251  
8574     
 
.424      
3.417       
1.478       
12.015       
0.167       
0.186      
0.265       
0.488       
 
 
36.920       
 
 
 
2.316 
0.326 
0.216       
0.251   
0.351 
0.306       
0.298      
 
0.457       
0.428       
0.327       
0.275       
0.368 
0.287       
 
84.126       
 
453 
 
0.543       
 
0.388       
 
0.196     
0.179   
0.111 
 
0.359          
0.422         
  
 
0.445         
0.464 
 6643 
                                                 
2 1 US dollar is about 8.76 Ethiopian Birr (Br.)  
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4. The Econometric Framework and Estimation Procedure 
Our analysis of the impact of CSB participation on the level of diversity 
maintained by households is based on a simultaneous estimation of diversity and 
participation equations. The level of diversity maintained by the ith household is, given 
by: 
ii
D
i
D
i PXD ηγβ ++=  
 
(1)
 Where iD  is the level of crop diversity; iP  is an indicator variable equal to 1 if 
the respondent participates in the CSB, iX  is a vector of socio-economic and physical 
farm characteristics, and iη  is an error term.  
For the ith individual, the participation equation is given by:  
⎩⎨
⎧ >++=
otherwise
uDXif
P ii
P
i
P
i 0
,01 γβ
 
(2)
and iu  is an error term. We assume that the errors in the two equations are 
independently, identically and normally distributed error terms with zero means. 
   The productivity analysis is intended to analyse the impact of CSB 
participation on productivity. In an imperfect seed system, productivity will not only be 
a function of farm and socio-economic characteristics, but also which source(s) the 
household accesses seeds from. Thus, the different seed sources as well as the number 
of seed sources will be determinants of productivity. In addition, there is also evidence 
that diversity is a determining factor in the level of productivity (Di Falco and Perrings, 
2003), so we include diversity as an additional determinant of productivity.  
Translog, log-linear and CES specifications are widely used in agricultural 
productivity analysis. Log-linear specification is common in cases where a considerable 
number of the independent variables are categorical/ dummy variables (Holden et al., 
2001). Accordingly, we adopt a log-linear specification where, for the ith household, the 
productivity equation becomes3:   
                                                 
3 Since we do not have information on labour input, we have not controlled for it although its effect may 
be crucial in the productivity analysis. 
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Y
i i i i i iY X P S Dβ λ ψ ϑ ζ= + + + +  
 
                               (3)
where iY  is the value of total yield per ha and iS stands for the different seed 
sources, iD  stands for the level of diversity; 
Pβ , Pγ , Dβ , Dγ , Yβ , λ , ϑ and ψ  are 
sets of coefficients to be estimated; and  iu η and iζ  are error terms corresponding to 
the three equations. It should be noted that iY  and the continuous variables in iX  are in 
logarithmic forms.  
Equation (3) is estimated using OLS4. However, because the endogenous 
variables appear as regressors in equations (1) and (2), equation-by-equation estimation 
results in biased and inconsistent estimates of the parameters (Greene, 2000).   
The two equations could be considered as a mixed simultaneous system of 
equations since the dependent variable in equation (1) is discrete and that in equation (2) 
is continuous. Heckman (1978) suggested a two-stage estimation procedure where the 
structural parameters are consistently estimated in two stages. While Heckman’s 
estimator is consistent, an alternative estimator was suggested by Amemiya (1978), 
which is shown by Lee (1981) to be the most efficient of the class of mixed 
simultaneous equation estimators (Zepeda, 1994). The procedure involves four stages 
where in the first stage the reduced form parameters are estimated using OLS and 
maximum likelihood respectively. The second stage recovers the starting value 
structural parameter estimates. The third stage obtains the asymptotic covariance matrix 
from estimates in the first and second stages. The Generalized Probit GLS estimates are 
obtained in the last stage using the starting value structural parameters and the variance 
covariance matrices. Details on the GPGLS estimation are found in Amemiya (1978), 
Zepeda (1994) and Dies and Hill (1998).  
Amemiya’s estimator, like any instrumental variable estimator, has the 
properties of asymptotic estimators5 which generally suffer from the problem of 
accuracy.  In order to assess the performance of the Amemiya’s estimator, we follow the 
procedure  in Deis and Hill (1998) where Amemiya’s (asymptotic) estimates are 
                                                 
4 It should be noted that there are no reasons to believe a priori that productivity affects participation in 
CSB or diversity directly. Thus, the productivity equation which assesses the productivity impact of CSB 
participation is not part of the simultaneity. 
5 Asymptotic estimators are estimators with known properties that apply to large samples and whose finite 
sample behavior is approximated by what is known about their large sample properties (Greene, 2000). 
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bootstrapped and the results from the original estimates and the bootstrapped estimates 
are compared6. A comparison of the asymptotic and bootstrapping results is done using 
percentage differences in each of the statistics where percentage differences are 
calculated as the ratio of (bootstrap) statistics - (asymptotic) statistics to the absolute 
value of the asymptotic statistic. The ‘bias t-statistics’ is calculated as the ratio of 
coefficient (asymptotic)- coefficient (bootstrap) to standard error (bootstrap)/10, and 
measures the statistical significance of an estimated coefficient’s bias.   
5. Results 
In Table 3, we present the estimation results for the diversity equation. The first part of 
the table shows the results from Amemiya’s GLS estimator and in the second, the 
results based on bootstraping are reported. Comparison of Amemiya’s and the bootstrap 
results is given in the third part of the table. The discussion of the results is based on the 
second part of the table. 
Socio-economic characterisics such as age, gender and education of the 
household head, appear to bear no relationship to the level of diversity maintained by 
households. This is in line with the findings by Benin et al. (2003) in their study of the 
determinants of cereal diversity in the Ethiopian Highlands where different measures of 
diversity and physical farm characteristics were found to be weak in explaining the level 
of diversity maintained by households. The only socio-economic factor significant in 
explaining diversity is wealth, which has a positive impact. Benin et al. (2003) observed 
a similar effect of wealth. They attributed the positive impact of wealth to the ability of 
less poor households to better use diverse set of resources.  
The village level dummies also had insignificant impact on the level of diversity. 
This could be for two reasons. One is the condensed nature of our sampling. The 
sampled villages are close to where the community seed bank is located which means 
that the villages are close to each other. That naturally dampens the agroecological and 
infrastructure variation. Furthermore, there can be counteracting effects of the village 
dummies. For example, villages with agroecological conditions favouring 
monocropping could be diversifying because of unfavourable market access. 
                                                 
6 The software package LIMDEP 8.0 was used to estimate both the asymptotic and bootstrap statistics. 
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We found diversity to be increasing with the amount of fertilizer applied. This 
result might appear counter intuitive given that fertilizer application is associated with 
use of improved seeds and reduced level of diversity. Smale et al. (1994), however, 
observed that, at very low (but not high) levels of fertilizer use, it pays to diversify as 
with moderate fertilizer application, local varieties might perform better than improved 
varieties. This indicates there could be a threshold to the effect of fertilizer use on the 
level of diversity where our case is likely to be below the threshold (where fertilizer use 
enhances diversity).  
The impact of CSB participation on diversity is positive and consistently 
significant across estimates. This indicates the effectiveness of CSB scheme in 
enhancing diversity. As we argued earlier, the modern seed system has a negative 
impact on participation. Thus, given present constraints to accessing modern varieties, 
the impact of CSB scheme as an effective instrument would be primarily deterred by a 
push for expanding the commercial seed system.  
 Comparison of Amemiya’s and bootstrap estimations shows that unlike like in 
the participation equation, many of the coefficient estimates are equally significant 
/insignificant across estimations. However, like the participation equation, the bias–t 
statistic is significant for some coefficients indicating significant bias in the coefficients 
estimated using Amemyia’s GLS. 
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Table 3: Simultaneous Equations Estimation Results with and without Bootstrap of the Diversity Equation 
Amemiya’s GLS simultaneous equation 
estimation 
Bootstrapping Amemiya’s GLS 
estimator 
Comparison of Amemiya’s and 
Bootstrap estimates 
 
Variable 
AGLS T-STAT T-crit 
(α=0.10) 
BGLS T-STAT BT-crit 
(α=0.10) 
%∆ in 
BETA 
%∆ in T Bias_T 
Wealth 
Oxen 
Age 
Female 
Radio 
Formal education 
Religious education 
Improved seed 
Farm size 
Medium slope 
Steep slope 
Moderately fertile 
Infertile 
Goro        
Addadi Gole         
Buae Tengego         
Kersa   
Menjikso      
Fertilizer 
Constant 
Participation 
0,029 ab 
0,004 
0,001 
0,283 a 
-0,072 
0,007 
-0,004 
0,016 a 
-0,001ab 
-0,103 
0,011 
0,092 
0,108 
-0,170 a 
-0,131 
-0,097 
-0,154 
-0,004 
0,004 ab 
0,948 a 
0,106 ab 
2,906 
0,186 
0,208 
2,195 
1,493 
0,087 
0,089 
1,752 
2,108 
1,175 
0,149 
1,405 
1,573 
2,000 
1,539 
1,076 
1,515 
0,047 
5,015 
6,032 
5,830 
2,481 
3,097 
4,594 
5,345 
2,001 
2,500 
2,273 
4,784 
1,751 
6,252 
20,845 
7,948 
5,682 
2,282 
2,564 
2,022 
2,348 
5,301 
2,170 
4,333 
2,147 
0,026 a 
0,009 
0,000 
0,326 
-0,078 
-0,007 
0,000 
0,020 a 
0,001 
-0,120 
0,035 
0,085 
0,149 
-0,209 
-0,171 
-0,125 
-0,180 
0,341 
0,001 a 
0,955 a 
0,095 ab 
2,294 
0,258 
0,091 
1,104 
1,293 
0,066 
0,004 
1,829 
1,259 
0,986 
0,463 
1,017 
1,422 
0,619 
0,509 
0,379 
0,530 
0,337 
3,136 
2,215 
4,231 
3,436 
2,556 
2,632 
4,007 
2,843 
2,561 
2,428 
3,774 
2,844 
3,090 
2,528 
2,750 
3,262 
3,743 
3,589 
3,050 
3,296 
7487 
5,394 
3,783 
2,664 
-0,223 
9,348 
-16,212 
-0,184 
0,043 
10,433 
2.557 
0,907 
0,293 
-0,450 
-2,390 
5,002 
3,015 
1,263 
0,054 
-0,588 
0,182 
152,799 
0,0423 
0,180 
-0,108 
-0,211 
0,383 
-1,440 
-0,497 
0,134 
-1,762 
0,960 
0,044 
0,403 
0,161 
2,109 
-0,276 
-0,096 
0,690 
0,669 
0,647 
0,650 
8,107 
-0,375 
-0,633 
-0,274 
0,647 
3,169 ab 
5,151 ab   
0,835 
1,785 
6,466 
-0,093 
-3,338 ab 
-5,210 ab 
1,375 
-3,157 ab 
0,910 
-3,914 ab 
1,151 
1,176 
0,847 
0,758 
-3,415 a 
-0,276 
-0,172 
4,711 ab 
 
 
                                                 
a Significant at 10% level, using the standard critical value (i.e. t=1.64) 
b Significant at 10% level, using the critical values derived from the empirical distribution of bootstrap t-values. 
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Table 4 presents the results from the simultaneous equation estimation of the CSB 
participation equation.  
Wealth and gender of the household head turn out to be significant 
socioeconomic determinants of participation. CSB varieties which are local generally 
have less/no fertilizer demand which makes them more attractive to the poor1. 
Compared to female-headed households, male-headed households are more likely to 
participate in CSB. However, other socio economic characteristics, such as training 
received within the year and education are not significant. The only scheme feature in 
our study, location of the CSB, also has a significantly negative impact on the 
likelihood of participation. Although distance to the CSB is the only factor that is 
associated with CSB and that varies between participants and non-participants in our 
data set, Smale et al. (2003) has shown that participation in a similar scheme would 
entail and transaction costs in terms of time and resources which we acknowledge to be 
a fairly important omission.  
The amount of improved seeds purchased on credit and total fertilizer used have 
a significantly negative impact on participation. The impact of diversity, representing 
knowledge and experience, is also positive and significant.  
The amount of improved seeds comes out as the only significant variable across 
estimations. This indicates substitutability between CSB varieties and those from the 
commercial seed system. Due to its perceived productivity advantages, there is and 
there will continue to be a push for increased adoption of the modern input package 
from the government’s side. Given the negative relationship, the continued push for 
adoption of improved varieties would lead to improvement in access to commercial 
seeds. In turn, this would lead to reduction in participation in the CSB.  
Comparison of the two methods shows that the bias-t is significant for almost all 
the coefficients giving evidence that Amemiya’s estimator suffers from inaccuracy in 
this case also.  
                                                 
1  An alternative interpretation here is that richer households could go for improved varieties that would 
give higher yields when combined with fertilizer. 
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Table 4: Simultaneous Equations Estimation Results with and without Bootstrap of the Participation Equation 
Amemiya’s GLS simultaneous equation 
estimation 
Bootstrapping Amemiya’s GLS 
estimator 
Comparison of Amemiya’s and 
Bootstrap estimates 
 
Variable 
AGLS T-STAT t- crit1  
(α=0.10) 
BGLS BT-STAT Bt- crit2 
(α=0.10) 
%∆ in 
BETA 
%∆ in T BIAS-T 
Training 
Wealth 
Age 
Female 
Radio 
Formal education 
Religious education 
Location of CSB 
Improved seed 
Farm size 
Medium slope 
Steep slope 
Moderately fertile 
Infertile 
Fertilizer 
Seed source 
Constant 
Shannon 
0,144 
-0,263a 
-0,0004 
-2,860 a 
0,747b 
-0,161 
-0,020 
-0,165 a 
-0,019 a 
0,006 a 
-0,047 
-0,607 
-0,662 
0,202 
-6,614 a 
-0,004 a 
-0,234 
9,581 a 
0,267 
2,697 
0,019 
2,376 
1,595 
0,202 
0,041 
1,860 
2,828 
1,766 
0,061 
0,935 
0,911 
0,375 
2,736 
2,706 
0,278 
2,730 
1,857 
4,207 
3,244 
5,674 
1,287 
1,728 
1,507 
2,092 
3,327 
2,874 
21,472 
4,815 
4,976 
1,469 
7,657 
4,298 
3,763 
4,979 
0,466 
-0,173 
0,013 
-3,298 
0,751 
-0,002 
-0,136 
-0,138 
-0,019 ab 
0,002 
-0,052 
-0,334 
-1,158 
0,406 
-4,376 
-0,002 
0,497 
6,280 
0,784 
1,143 
0,533 
1,024 
1,431 
0,002 
0,267 
1,154 
2,192 
0,342 
0,069 
0,414 
1,236 
0,685 
0,987 
1,153 
0,367 
1,116 
2,700 
5,269 
2,767 
4,653 
3,698 
2,729 
2,375 
4,412 
1,611 
2,685 
2,525 
2,417 
3,427 
3,045 
2,918 
6,870 
5,104 
5,551 
4,482  
0,792 
125,072  
0,182 
0,076 
-3,379 
-13,431  
0,651 
0,626 
-0,853 
-3,380 
-1,039 
-1,956 
0,117 
0,579 
0,805 
8,232 
-0,915 
3,112  
-1,066 
45,599  
-1,157 
0,149 
-4,083 
-15,101  
-1,163 
-1,139 
-0,947 
-1,258 
-1,440 
-1,663 
-0,146 
-1,091 
-1,061 
1,178 
-0,974 
-5,418 ab 
-5,910 ab 
-5,473 ab 
1,361 
-0,077 
-1,664 
2,281 ab 
-2,231 
0,446 
6,860 ab 
0,057 
-3,388 ab 
5,295 ab 
-3,435 ab 
-5,047 ab 
-4,796 ab 
-5,397 ab 
5,867 
 
                                                 
1 The critical values are obtained from the empirical distribution of the bootstrap t-values where each t value corresponds to a bootstrap replication (following Dies and 
Hill, 1998). We used 100 bootstrap replications for the results. 
2 The bootstrap t-critical values are obtained from bootstrapping the bootstrapped samples. The bootstrap replications in the second bootstrap are 10. 
a Significant at 10% level, using the standard critical value (i.e. t=1.64) 
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Table (5) presents the results from the OLS estimates of the productivity 
equation. The productivity equation relates the value of production per ha to the 
different seed sources, diversity measure, socio-economic, physical farm and agro 
ecological characteristics.  
The socio-economic factors, namely gender and wealth of the household head, 
have turned out to be insignificant in explaining productivity. However, productivity is 
found to significantly decline with age. The number of oxen, measuring access to 
traction power, is an insignificant determinant of productivity. The coefficient for total 
area is negative, lending support the inverse farm size-productivity relationship. 
Productivity was shown not to significantly vary with the proportions of hillside and 
infertile plots. The impact of fertilizer application is positive and significant.  
The impact of own seed on productivity is significant. The positive impact of 
own seeds on productivity is intuitive since own storage indicates the ability to save a 
portion of previous harvest and reduces the cost of accessing seeds from other sources. 
Access to informal seed sources, particularly borrowing from fellow farmers has 
significant positive impact on productivity. This indicates the importance and the role of 
informal links in reducing transaction costs in accessing seeds. Access to the 
commercial seed varieties does not have significant impact on productivity. This might 
appear counter intuitive since the commercial varieties are tipped to be of superior 
productive quality. Borrowing from CSB has significant impact on productivity 
indicating that CSB as a seed source improves the working of the existing seed system.  
This is also in line with the findings by Sperling et al. (1996) where improvement in 
seed system led to increase in productivity. 
Diversity, as measured by the Shannon index was shown to be a positive 
determinant of productivity consistent with the theoretical and empirical findings by Di 
Falco and Perrings (2003)1.  
                                                 
1 The total number of seed sources households accessed seeds from was found to be correlated to the 
other seed sources and diversity so it was dropped out of the productivity analysis. 
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Table 5: Estimation Results for the Determinants of Productivity 
Variable Log Value of total  
yield per ha. 
Standard error 
Own seed 
CSB seed 
Borrowed seed 
Exchanged seed 
Extension seed 
Female 
Log(age) 
Formal Education 
Religious Education 
Log(oxen) 
Log(wealth) 
Log(Farm size) 
Log(Fertilizer) 
Medium slope 
Steep slope 
Moderately fertile 
Infertile 
Goro     
Addadi Gole         
Buae Tengego         
Kersa   
Menjikso 
Log(Shanon) 
Constant 
0.359  
0.253 
0.161 
0.095 
0.104 
-0.204 
-0.258 
0.036 
-0.079 
-0.022 
0.270 
-0.398 
0.005 
-0.346 
-0.020 
0.002 
0.009 
0.003 
-0.008 
-0.166 
-0.222 
0.021 
0.018 
9.324 
0.084*** 
0.155*  
0.167 
0.296 
0.091 
0.174 
0.120** 
0.115 
0.065 
0.014 
0.068*** 
0.061*** 
0.003* 
0.237 
0.020 
2.083 
0.005* 
0.116 
0.118 
0.126 
0.142 
0.120 
0.010* 
0.635*** 
Adjusted R- squared  0.56  
Note: *** stands for significance at 1% level and ** stands for significance at 5% level. 
  
 
75
 
6. Conclusions 
Biodiversity conservation initiatives in large monocropped farms have been associated 
with monetary compensation to ‘conservator’ farmers who choose to engage in the 
particular program (see for e.g. Wossink and Wenum, 2003). However, in small 
multicropping farming systems with imperfections in the seed system, expanding the 
provision of local seeds sources might improve seed access and enhance farm level 
diversity. 
 In line with this, the study examines a scheme called Community Seed Banking 
(CSB), which aims at increasing biodiversity of individual farms through improving the 
local seed supply system. The particular objectives of the study have been to assess the 
potential of the CSB in enhancing diversity and in improving access to local seeds.  
We hypothesized that participation in CSB leads to enhancement of 
agrobiodiversity. We also argued that provision of local varieties in the CSB alleviates 
the problem of seed access and thus CSB participation would improve productivity. In 
addition, we proposed that the existing level of biodiversity would have a positively 
enforcing impact on participation in CSB. The relationships we proposed implied 
endogeniety of diversity and CSB participation measures. To assess the possible 
simultaneity, we employed the Generalized Probit GLS estimator, which was developed 
by Amemiya (1978) to handle simultaneous equations with mixed endogenous 
variables. The performance of the GLS estimator is also examined using the 
bootstrapping technique.  
Our results confirm a significant impact of participation in CSB on farm level 
biodiversity. Holding other factors constant, a CSB participant household has around 
10% higher diversity than a non-participant household. The effect of participation on 
diversity is the strongest effect compared to other determinants of diversity. This 
indicates that expansion of CSB and in a manner that targets likely participants better 
would be an effective mechanism of enhancing biodiversity.  
Furthermore, CSB participation was shown to significantly increase the 
productivity of participant farmers. The implication is that agrobiodiversity 
conservation could be enhanced through provision of desirable local varieties. On the 
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other hand, the level of diversity did not have a significant impact on participation 
implying that participation is not necessarily conditioned by previous knowledge and 
experience with respect to maintaining diversity. The number of seed sources farmers 
access seeds from did not significantly explain participation. However, access to 
improved varieties, which comprise the modern seed system, was shown to reduce the 
likelihood of participation in the CSB. This implies that given the current working of 
the seed system, CSB could work as a conservation instrument for seed-poor farmers 
who have less access to the commercial seed system. On the other hand, with 
improvement in the working of the commercial seed system, overall participation in the 
CSB would reduce. This further leads to reduction in the potential of CSB as a 
mechanism enhancing conservation.  
This implies that while CSB participation is an instrument to enhancing 
diversity, increased improved seed use seems to deter participation. As a result, 
instruments, which explicitly reward ‘conservator’ farmers, should be in place for 
sustainable agrobiodiversity conservation in light of improved access to the modern 
seed system. Projects that enhance the current use value of local varieties could be such 
additional instruments. In their evaluation of a participatory crop improvement project 
which aimed at encouraging landrace maize conservation in Mexico, Smale et al. (2003) 
found that availing better yielding/ higher fodder quality landrace varieties encouraged 
farmers to grow them.  
 The results also show that plot-level productivity is affected by seed sources, 
with own-source and CSB seeds making a significant positive impact. This indicates 
that seeds channeled through such sources are likely to be effective in enhancing the 
productivity of farm households. However, the study does not assess the particular 
nature of the seeds accessed from the different sources, the type of households that 
access seed largely from these sources or the transaction costs involved in getting seed 
from these sources. Future research may be needed to analyze these factors to identify 
the most effective way(s) of availing seeds to farmers.  
Older households were also shown to have lower productivity, which might be 
due to labour constraints which leads them to farm their land under suboptimal 
labour/rental arrangement. As per results from productivity analysis in Ethiopia and 
many similar places, wealth of the household is a significant and positive determinant of 
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productivity. However, seed from the national seed distribution (extension system) does 
not seem to significantly contribute to productivity. Fertilizer use has a positive and 
significant impact but a very weak one. A percentage increase in fertilizer only 
increases productivity by 1%. In addition, the impact of fertilizer use is only significant 
at 10%. This indicates that the national extension system which is responsible for 
delivering external inputs like fertilizer and improved seeds to enhance productivity is 
not  a very effective instrument of doing so and further research is needed to evaluate 
and improve its performance.  
Diversity is found to be a positive determinant of productivity indicating that 
in farming systems characterized by low-market access and risky production 
environment, favoring multicropping and biodiversity would enhance productivity. 
Moreover, this also supports obervations that biodiverse systems are actually more 
productive than monocropped systems.  
  Our investigation of the performance of the GLS estimator vis-à-vis the 
bootstrap yielded that the asymptotic results were significantly different from the 
bootstrapped results. This is in line with previous studies, which compared asymptotic 
and bootstrapping estimates. The implication is that techniques like bootstrapping 
should be used to get accurate estimations when asymptotic estimators are employed. 
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Abstract 
This paper develops a measure of the value of biodiversity by incorporating a stochastic 
change in the environmental factor into an economy-ecosystem model of biodiversity. 
The analysis draws from an ecological model specifying the relationship between 
aggregate productivity, responsiveness to environmental change, and diversity. The 
value of biodiversity is derived as the contribution of diversity in enhancing the 
ecosystem’s adaptive response to environmental change. The results are relevant to 
biodiversity conservation efforts that target areas with differing degrees of 
environmental variation. In addition, our analysis of some features of global warming 
the results imply that with increased concerns of global warming, more needs to be 
invested in biodiversity. 
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1. Introduction 
The desire to conserve biodiversity1 is essentially motivated by two major concerns. 
One is that when a species becomes extinct, the social value associated with its possible 
future use is lost. In addition, as Blockstein (1998) argues, the loss of species could lead 
to cascading changes, since natural ecosystems are complex and highly interdependent, 
and small perturbations can lead to far-reaching changes with unexpected repercussions 
(Heal, 2004). Thus, individual species possess not only social benefits of their own; 
they also carry a joint value shared with other species, which is associated with an 
uncertainty in the functioning of an ecosystem composed of different species (Fromm, 
2000). Measuring and assessing this joint value has attracted considerable interest and 
this paper is one such endeavor to add to this effort. The major contribution of our 
approach is its reliance on an ecological framework that objectively specifies species 
interrelationships and accounts for species’ dynamic responsiveness to stochastic 
environmental change2 in an aggregate manner. This realistic yet aggregate 
representation gives us the advantage of assessing the contribution of diversity to 
environmental adaptation in the context of complex species relationships and without 
relying on simplifying assumptions. 
When valuing individual species, the focus has been on attaching values to 
benefits related to the use and existence of each species. Since use and existence values 
are inherent to people’s preferences and hence to their willingness to pay (Moran and 
Bann, 2000), conceptualization of the values has been less difficult. Stated preference 
methods have been popular, assigning monetary values to threatened or extinct species 
and their habitats (e.g. Loomis and White, 1996; Montgomery et al., 1999). On the other 
hand, valuing diversity with respect to species interdependencies has been characterized 
by wide-ranging definitions and metrics. One explanation to this is that there are many 
different assumptions about species inter-relationships and their interaction with the 
environment. A unifying approach could be having a comprehensive account of such 
                                                 
1 Biodiversity is defined as the variety of life at all levels of organization, from the level of genetic 
variation within and among species to the level of variation within and among ecosystems and biomes 
(Tilman, 1997).    
2 In the context used in this study, the environmental factor represents an exogenous phenomenon which 
conditions the performance of the ecosystem, and which exhibits an unpredictable change over time.  
Norberg et al. (2001) use temperature or predator abundance as examples. 
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relationships. However, Crepin (2002) argues that with such approaches, species 
multiplicity and richness, and the resulting non-linearities in the relationships, make 
valuation exercises cumbersome and practically unmanageable.  
Thus, appropriate biodiversity valuation calls for a framework that balances off 
the need to account for complex species interrelationships on the one hand, and to be 
simple enough to analyze theoretically, on the other.  
In line with this, earlier approaches focus on specific species relationships. 
Examples include Principe (1989) where species values are additive; Solow et al. (1993) 
where adjustments should be made to possible redundancies in species use; and Polasky 
and Solow (1995) where species interdependences should also be valued.  
Incorporating ecological information to the measurement of biodiversity value 
has been increasingly popular in recent studies. A pioneering work in this regard is 
Weitzman (1998) who used a genetic distance concept in deriving a diversity function. 
Brock and Xepapadeas (2003) refined this measure by integrating the genetic distance 
concept to an economically desirable measure of species responsiveness to 
environmental stress. However, in their analysis, the evolution of the environmental 
factor (pest) follows a predictable pattern and species’ response to environmental stress 
is fixed i.e. an underperforming species will remain so even when the environmental 
factor changes. On the other hand, Kassar and Lasserre (2004) argue that environmental 
changes are uncertain and species value evolves following the impetus from the 
environment in continuous evolution. However, their analysis is restricted to species 
that are perfectly substitutable in their use. Other studies which employ ecological 
models to assess the role of diversity in ecosystem functioning include Tilman et al. 
(2005) and Eichner and Pethig (2006). 
In light of this, our approach employs an ecological model of diversity 
developed by Norberg et al. (2001), which aggregates the behavior of a group of species 
with respect to overall productivity, diversity, and the group’s ability to respond to 
environmental stress. The model has a thorough specification of species 
interdependencies and incorporates explicit species-environmental factor relationships 
in a manner that allows dynamic species responses to environmental stress. Thus, our 
approach has the advantage of not only specifying complex species interrelationships 
objectively, but also of accounting for their changing performances with respect to 
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changes in the environment. In addition to its thorough specification, it explains the 
behavior of the ecosystem using aggregate measures making it theoretically manageable 
to analyze.  
We derive the gain (loss) from biodiversity by considering outcomes under 
myopic and full information management regimes. This approach borrows from Brock 
and Xepapadeas (2003) where the difference between two species and one species value 
functions gives the endogenous value of biodiversity.  
Section 2 presents the ecological model, which is the basis of our analysis. In 
Section 3, we set up the optimization problems and obtain the corresponding solutions 
under myopic and fully foresighted management regimes. Simulation results are given 
in Section 4, and Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. The ecological model and its relation to biodiversity value 
As mentioned in the introduction, we base our analysis on an ecological model 
developed by Norberg et al. (2001), which defines species interrelationships and their 
responsiveness to environmental change. By using moment approximation methods, the 
model captures the dynamics of the macroscopic/aggregate characteristics of the group 
of species in terms of total biomass, average phenotype3 and phenotypic variance. The 
total biomass aggregates the productivity of all the different species at a given point in 
time. Similarly, the average phenotype measures the average successional response of 
all the species to environmental change. The phenotypic variance, which we use as a 
measure of diversity,4  represents the spread of individual. species phenotypes around 
the mean.  
The resulting model provides a framework that is simple enough to analyze 
theoretically but which captures essential aspects such adaptive complex systems. The 
model also has an intuitive economic appeal since the total biomass, average phenotype, 
and phenotypic variance represent overall productivity, responsiveness to environmental 
stress, and a measure of diversity of the ecosystem, respectively. 
                                                 
3 Phenotype is defined as the morphological, physiological, biochemical, behavioural, and other 
properties of an organism that develop through the interaction of genes and environment (World 
Resources Institute, 1992). 
4 While there are other measures of diversity, Norberg et al. (2001) argue that phenotypic variance may be 
a more appropriate measure of diversity when relating diversity to ecosystem functioning. 
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The mathematical formulation of the model is given as: 
2( )o
dQ f vf Q a
dt
= + +                                           (1)
1
dX vf b
dt
= +                                            (2)
 
where Q is the total biomass; dQ
dt
is the rate of change of biomass; X is the average 
phenotype of the whole group of species; dX
dt
 is the rate of change of the average 
phenotype; of  is the aggregate growth function of the different species;  1f  and 2f  are 
the first and second derivatives of the growth function with respect to X;  v  is the 
phenotypic variance; a  is a constant representing the amount of biomass immigrating 
from the external environment; and b  is the corresponding average phenotype of the 
immigrating species. 5  
The growth function, of , and its first and second derivatives with respect to X, 
1f , and 2f are specified as: 
6 
2(1 )(1 ( ) )o
Qf E X
K
= − − −                                               (3)
1 2(1 )( )
Qf E X
K
= − −                                               (4)
2 2(1 )
Qf
K
= − −                                               (5)
where E  is the environmental factor and K  is the carrying capacity. 
Substituting the expressions for of , 1f , and 2f  into equations (1) and (2) gives: 
2[(1 )(1 ( ) ) 2 (1 )]dQ Q QE X v Q a
dt K K
= − − − − − +   
(6)
2 (1 )( )dX Qv E X b
dt K
= − − +   
(7)
                                                 
5Unlike the original model, we assumed the addition of external input of biomass to be a constant. Thus, 
expressions related to external input of biomass that appear in the original model are not included here. In 
addition, in the original model, the value of the phenotypic variance changes over time due 
environmentally determined immigration of species from the surroundings. In our case, phenotypic 
variance is constant since we assume immigration of species to be constant. 
6 The specification of the growth function was kindly given to us by Jon Norberg.  
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(7)
 
Equation (3) specifies the growth equation of  as a logistic growth equation extended to 
incorporate the role of the environmental factor, diversity, and responses to 
environmental change. The first bracket represents a standard logistic growth equation. 
The second bracket is an expression for the difference between the optimal average 
phenotype and the current average phenotype.7 Thus, the larger the 
expression 2( )E X− is, the farther the system is from optimal performance with respect 
to the environmental condition, and vice versa.  
Equation (4) gives an expression for the first derivative of the growth equation, 
1f . The slope of the growth function increases, 1f , when ( )E X−  is positive, or when 
the average phenotype is moving towards the environmental optimum. Similarly, 1f  
decreases when ( )E X− is negative, i.e. when the average phenotype is moving away 
from the environmental optimum. Equation (5) gives the expression for the second 
derivative of the growth function, 2f , which is always negative. 
This approach essentially decomposes the impact of biodiversity on ecosystem 
functioning into two components. The first component, which corresponds to equation 
(1) relates the growth of the total biomass, dQ
dt
, to the diversity measure, v, holding the  
average phenotype,  X, constant. The second component is represented by equation (2), 
which relates the dynamics of the average phenotype, dX
dt
, to the diversity measure, v, 
where the total biomass, Q, is held constant.   
As can be seen in equation (1), the growth of the total biomass, dQ
dt
, decreases 
with diversity, v ,  since the second derivative of the growth equation, 2f , is always 
negative. The negative relationship between biomass growth, dQ
dt
, and the diversity 
measure, v, indicates that higher diversity reduces the growth of total biomass, holding 
                                                 
7  The current state of the environment, E, corresponds to the environmentally determined optimal 
average phenotype, Xopt. A positive change in X corresponds to a movement towards the environmental 
optimum, Xopt while a negative change in X corresponds to a movement away from it.  
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the average phenotype, X, constant, among other factors. In other words, for a given 
value of the environmental factor and the average phenotype, there will be one species 
outperforming all the others. With diversity, the presence of underperforming species 
increases, which decreases the overall productivity of the system. Intuitively, diversity 
would imply that there is one outperforming species (corresponding to the given 
environmental factor), while all the other species are underperforming. The suboptimal 
species take up space and resources, which could be used more efficiently by the 
outperforming species. As a result, the more diverse the ecosystem, the slower the rate 
at which its productivity increases. Thus, equation (1) depicts the cost of diversity to 
the productivity of the system.  
Equation (2) specifies the relationship between the rate of change in the average 
phenotype of the whole species, dX
dt
, and the diversity measure, v , holding the total 
biomass, Q, constant. According to this relationship, the rate of change of the average 
phenotype, dX
dt
, falls when 1f  decreases. Similarly, the rate of growth of the average 
phenotype increases when 1f  increases. A positive change in the average phenotype, 
dX
dt
, corresponds to movement towards the environmentally determined optimum 
average phenotype and vice versa. This implies that the system moves away from an 
environmentally determined optimum when 1f  is positive, while it moves towards the 
environmentally determined optimum when 1f  is negative. Since diversity, v, multiplies 
1f  in the equation, it determines the rate at which the system moves towards/away from 
the environmental optimum.  
Intuitively, since the dynamics of the average phenotype captures the system’s 
adaptive response to environmental stress, the ecosystem may be in a state where it is 
negatively or positively responding to the stress. Higher diversity enhances the 
ecosystem’s ability to have positive adaptive responses if the system is moving towards 
the optimal average phenotype. If the system is moving away from the optimum, 
diversity further dampens the coping ability of the system. In sum, while equation (1) 
depicts the cost of having diversity at any point in time, equation (2) depicts the 
responsiveness of species to the environmental factor which is conditioned by diversity.  
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Our approach is to measure the value of diversity in terms of the gain in the 
present value of harvest (from the total biomass) from having diversity. In order to 
derive the value of diversity this way, we consider two management regimes that give 
alternative values for the present value of harvest.  We call the management regime that 
only considers the dynamics of the biomass only (i.e. equation 1) myopic management. 
The second regime is a fully foresighted management, where both the dynamics of the 
biomass (equation 1) and the dynamics of the average phenotype (equation 2) are 
considered. Our premise is that since biomass is a source of harvest, its dynamics is of 
direct economic interest. On the other hand, the dynamics of the average phenotype 
depicts the system’s responsiveness to environmental change, which represents its 
adaptation to the environment and hence the system’s long term productivity. Since 
average phenotype is not a direct factor in the system’s immediate productivity and 
harvest does not (directly) depend on it, it is not of direct economic importance. If 
optimization only considers biomass dynamics, then it leaves out an important indirect 
effect. Thus, by disregarding the dynamics of the average phenotype, the myopic 
management fails to account for the indirect effect, which captures the ecosystem’s 
adaptive response to environmental stress. On the other hand, fully foresighted 
management takes into account both the dynamics of the total biomass and the average 
phenotype. Based on this, this paper intends to obtain the gain (loss) of biodiversity as 
the difference in outcomes under the two management regimes.  
In the ecological model, E is a time varying factor that could be characterized by 
a constant or variable rate of change over time. The variable rate E leads to more 
complicated dynamics (Norberg et al., 2001: p11377), 8 but is also more interesting 
since it can accommodate unpredictable changes in the environment.  
Based on this, we take E to be a stochastic variable, and consider a random value 
of the environmental factor with a Brownian motion. Accordingly, the following 
stochastic differential equation specification is chosen.  
( ) ( )dE dt t dz tα σ= +  (8)
                                                 
8 Their analysis involving variable rates of environmental change considered seasonally oscillatory and 
reddened noise time series types of environmental behaviour.  
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where α  could take a zero value or could be a non-zero constant9, σ  is the 
instantaneous standard deviation of the environmental variable, and )(tdz is the 
increment to a standard Gauss-Weiner process.  
 
3. Alternative management outcomes 
This section develops a framework that enables derivation of the value of 
biodiversity. The basis of our analysis is the ecological model (discussed in Section 2), 
which specifies that short term productivity is reduced by diversity due to the presence 
of suboptimal species, while long term productivity may be enhanced by diversity due 
to its possible contribution to environmental adaptation. Accordingly, the first 
management regime we consider, myopic management, takes into account the impact of 
diversity on short-term productivity. The full-foresighted management regime 
incorporates impacts of diversity both on short and long-term productivity. 
Our approach is to evaluate the outcomes of the two management regimes by 
computing the corresponding present values of harvest. Each of the management 
outcomes are assessed using a bio-economic model that consists of a sole owner-
manager who maximizes the present net value of benefits from harvesting part of the 
biomass.  
The benefit from harvesting is a function of price, p, and biomass harvest, q. 
Harvest is a function of harvesting effort, y, and total biomass,Q . The total benefit from 
harvesting is, thus, pyQ . The cost of harvesting is given as 2sy , where s is a constant. 
The net benefit from harvesting at a specific point in time (where the time index is 
omitted) is the difference between the total benefit and the cost of harvesting, 
2pyQ sy− .10 The sole manager would seek to maximize the sum of the discounted 
stream of net benefit from harvesting the biomass with the a risk-free, positive discount 
rate given by r .   
                                                 
9 With ( ) 0tα = , the pattern of the environmental variable will be purely random. Any other positive 
and constant value of ( )tα , the pattern exhibits an increasing trend. 
10 By doing so we have assumed a quadratic objective function.  
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It should be noted that, to come up with such a net benefit function, we relied on 
certain assumptions with respect to harvest and prices. We assumed a harvest function 
linear in effort and aggregate biomass. Given that harvest functions are commonly 
specified as quadratic (e.g. Crepin, 2002), our choice of the functional form is a 
simplification.  
To value the harvest, we have assumed a single price corresponding to the total 
biomass. As we argued in the introduction, our focus is on the contribution of 
biodiversity to ecosystem functioning. In our analysis, species derive their distinct 
features from their individual contribution to the total biomass11 and their individual  
response to environmental stress. Thus, different species contribute different amounts of 
biomass and have different levels of environmental responsiveness, at every point in 
time. An additional difference could be that the qualities of biomass contributed by 
different species may be different leading to different market prices of the biomass 
corresponding to the different species (Tilman and Polasky, 2006)12. While the value of 
biomass for the different species could be different, we assumed away the price 
differences. Our analytical framework, which is realistic in many respects and hence 
complex, did not allow us to incorporate the possible price differences of the species 
with respect to biomass.  
Below, we present our analysis of alternative management strategies of a 
biologically diverse ecosystem. The outcomes of the two strategies are evaluated in 
terms of the respective present net benefits from harvest. Our objective is to find the 
insurance value of biodiversity by computing the difference in the values of harvest 
under full-foresighted and myopic management regimes. 
 
3.1. Myopic management  
The myopic manager maximizes the present value of net benefits from harvest, subject 
to the growth of biomass over time. However, she disregards the impact of a changing 
environment on the performance of each of the different species. In other words, she 
does perceive the environmental factor as a variable that has an impact on the dynamics 
                                                 
11 Note that the total biomass is the sum of individual species biomasses.  
12  It should be noted that the ecological model conveniently aggregates the amounts of biomass 
contributed by the different species, for each period of time. In addition it also aggregates the contribution 
to environmental responsiveness by each species. What is not taken into account in the model is, as 
opposed to the biomass amounts, the quality of biomass contributed by each species.   
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of the biomass. However, she treats the average phenotype of the different species in the 
system as a constant, with no dynamics as a response to the change in the environmental 
factor over time. Mathematically, the problem is stated as:  
 
2
0
(0, , , ) max ( )
T
rt
o o y
W Q E T e pyQ sy dt−= −∫             (10)  
 s.t. 
2[(1 )(1 ( ) ) 2 (1 )]TdC Q QE X v Q a yQ
dt K K
= − − − − − + −                (11)  
( ) ( )dE dt t dz tα σ= +                (12) 
where (0) oQ Q= , (0) oE E= , T represents the end time and W is the value of the 
opportunity to exploit the multispecies ecosystem. Following Malliaris and Brock 
(1982), the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman’s equation for the above problem is given by:  
2 2 21max{( ) (1 )(1 ( ) ) 2 ((1 ))
2t Q E EEy
Q QW pyQ sy W E X v Q a yQ W W
K K
α σ⎡ ⎤− = − + − − − − − + − + +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦           (13) 
From (13), the solution to the optimal level of effort, y, is: 
*
2
QpQ W Qy
s
−=                   (14) 
Substituting the optimal effort into the HJB equation transforms the expression into:  
2 2 21( * * ) ((1 )(1 ( ) ) 2 (1 )) * *
2t Q E EE
Q QW py Q sy W E X v Q a y Q W W
K K
α σ⎡ ⎤− = − + − − − − − + − + +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
                   (15) 
It should be noted that the functional form of the value function, W, is not known, 
which also implies that its derivatives, tW , QW , EW , and EEW  are not known either. 
Since our problem is not in the class of stochastic optimization problems that are 
quadratic in the objective function and linear in the constraints, the functional form 
cannot also be approximated (Dockner, 2000). Thus, we find a numerical solution for W 
that is piece-wise linear13. The program C++ was have to obtain the numerical solution 
in a number of discrete points. The program Matlab was then used to do linear 
interpolations between the discrete points to get a solution for W that is piecewise linear.  
With a solution for W, equation (15) could be used to solve for QW , which transforms 
expression (14) into  
                                                 
13  I would like to thank Tobias Göbak, for his help in coding the problem in C++ and Matlab.  
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*
*
2
QpQ W Qy
s
−=                      (16) 
 
The solution for Q  that corresponds to the optimal effort, *y , is obtained by solving 
the following system of differential equations 
2[(1 )(1 ( ) ) 2 (1 )] *dQ Q QE X v Q a y Q
dt K K
= − − − − − + −              (17) 
( ) ( )dE dt t dz tα σ= +                           (18) 
2 (1 )( )dX Qv E X b
dt K
= − − +                   (19) 
It should also be noted that although the rate of change of the average phenotype is not 
taken into account in the manager’s decision making, its evolution would naturally 
impact upon the evolution of the biomass. Thus, the solution for Q for would also 
incorporate the solution to X. The corresponding numerical solution is coded using 
Matlab.  
The parameters in the systems of equations are given in the Appendix. Our 
choice of many of the parameters is closely based on Norberg et al. (2001). These 
include parameters like the initial values for the total biomass and the average 
phenotype, and the external inputs of biomass and phenotype.14  Due to the nature of the 
growth function and the resulting equations for the dynamics of the total biomass and 
the average phenotype, we were restricted to using a diversity measure less than 1. We 
chose the price, interest rate, and carrying capacity values arbitrarily but in a manner 
that allowed for convergence.  
Figure 1 shows the patterns of environmental change over time when the growth 
of the average phenotype is not taken into account in the planner’s decision making. 
Hence the figure depicts the myopic management scenario. The first panel in the figure 
shows the dynamics of the total biomass over time, where the end time is 20 units. The 
second panel depicts the movement of the environmental variable over time, while the 
third panel shows the pattern of the dynamics of the average phenotype over time. The 
environmental variable, E, depicts an environmental change with Brownian motion 
                                                 
14  It should be noted that, in the case of Norberg et al. [14] the simulations were run for individual 
species to study the aggregate characteristics.  
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which also follows a roughly cyclical pattern with a slightly upward pattern followed by 
a downward pattern. The average phenotype roughly follows a similar direction as the 
environmental variable albeit with a smoother pattern. The total biomass follows a 
steadily falling trend. 
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Figure 1: Behaviors of Q, E, and X under random environmental change with Brownian 
motion  
              
 
 
3.2. The fully foresighted management  
Under this management regime, the dynamics of the average phenotype, or the 
responsiveness of the multispecies ecosystem to environmental stress, is considered in 
addition to the dynamics of the total biomass. Thus, the average phenotype of the group 
of species is (correctly) perceived to be evolving over time. This is the difference 
between this management scenario and the myopic scenario, where the average 
phenotype is perceived to be a constant and not responsive to environmental changes. 
Given a perfect foresight scenario, the manager’s problem is stated as:  
2
0
(0, , , , ) max ( )
T
rt
o o o y
W Q X E T e pyQ sy dt−= −∫                    (18) 
s.t. 
2[(1 )(1 ( ) ) 2 (1 )]TdC Q QE X v Q a yQ
dt K K
= − − − − − + −           (19) 
2 (1 )( )dX Qv E X b
dt K
= − − +                (20) 
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( ) ( )dE dt t dz tα σ= +                         (21) 
where (0) oQ Q= , (0) oE E= , T represents the end time and W is the value of the 
opportunity to exploit the multispecies ecosystem. The corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman equation becomes:  
 2 2 21max{( ) (1 )(1 ( ) ) 2 ((1 )) [2 (1 )( ) ]
2t Q X E EEy
Q Q QW pyQ sy W E X v a yQ W v E X b W W
K K K
α σ⎡ ⎤− = − + − − − − − + − + − − + + +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
  (22) 
From equation (22), we solve for y, which is the optimal level of effort corresponding to 
the optimal harvesting rule: 
*
2
QpQ W Qy
s
−=                  (23) 
Substituting the optimal effort into the HJB equation transforms the expression into:  
2 2 21* * (1 )(1 ( ) ) 2 ((1 )) * [2 (1 )( ) ]
2t Q X E EE
Q Q QW py Q sy W E X v a y Q W v E X b W W
K K K
α σ⎡ ⎤− = − + − − − − − + − + − − + + +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
              (24) 
Figure (2) analyzes the dynamics of the biologically diverse ecosystem under 
fully foresighted management. The pattern of the environmental change is similar to the 
myopic case because the environmental change is exogenous and is not affected by the 
dynamics within the model. Similarly, the pattern of the dynamics of the average 
phenotype is similar to that under myopia. As can be seen in equation (18), the average 
phenotype is not a function of the total biomass, Q, or harvest, y. Thus the harvest 
decisions that differ between the myopic and the full foresight management regimes do 
not affect the evolution of the average phenotype. Due to this, the patterns of the 
average phenotype under the two management regimes (i.e. in Figures 1 and 2) are 
identical. 
The dynamics of the total biomass follow an interaction of the pattern of the 
environmental factor and the average phenotype: when the environmental factor and the 
average phenotype move close to each other, the total biomass tends to increase over 
time and decrease whenever the environmental factor and the average phenotype move 
apart.   
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Figure 2: Behaviors of Q, E  and X under random environmental change with Brownian 
motion (high standard deviation). 
 
 
4. Biodiversity value based on simulation results  
As explained earlier, the value of biodiversity is computed as the difference between the 
present values of harvest under fully foresighted and myopic management regimes. For 
each regime, optimal harvest/effort and the corresponding total biomass values at each 
point in time are computed, which are, in turn, used to calculate the stream of net 
benefits from harvest.  Discounting and summing up the net benefit values gives the 
present values of harvest under each management scenario.   
The basis of our analysis is the case where the environmental variable exhibits a 
random value with a Brownian motion. Since the environmental factor is a stochastic 
variable, its realized value is one out of the many possible random values. In order to 
account for the randomness, we run ten simulations, each representing (an arbitrarily) 
low environmental variation. Each simulation is run for myopia and full 
foresightedness, under a given environmental outcome, and the results provide the 
present value of harvest corresponding to the two management regimes. Table 1 
presents the present value of harvest for the myopic and fully foresighted management 
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under (an arbitrarily) low environmental variation. The first column gives the present 
value of harvest under myopia; hence the results represent the harvest value of the 
ecosystem disregarding its responsiveness to environmental stress. The second column 
corresponds to the present value of harvest under full foresight, i.e. when the 
ecosystem’s responsiveness to environmental stress is taken into account. The 
difference between the two values is computed to give the value of diversity. The 
average of the differences gives the expected value of diversity, and the standard 
deviation of the differences gives the spread of the actual diversity values around the 
expected value of diversity.  
The result shows that the biodiversity value is positive for all the considered 
cases, and hence diversity enhances the system’s adaptive response to environmental 
stress. This is in line with Brock and Xepapadeas[3], who found that biodiversity 
increases productivity through providing an insurance mechanism that controls the 
system’s adaptation to pest dynamics.  
However, the value of diversity for given environmental outcomes differ from 
very high to zero depending on how close/far apart the present values of harvest are 
from each other under the two management regimes.  
 
Table 1: Comparison of Fully Foresighted and Myopic Management Regimes under 
Low-Variation Environmental Change (Low Standard Deviation) 
 
Present value of harvest 
(Full foresight) 
Present value of harvest 
(Myopia) 
Difference 
88.90 0.29 88.61 
1.30 1.30 0.00 
216.20 0.81 215.39 
0.77 0.73 0.04 
0.48 0.48 0.00 
0.88 0.86 0.02 
175.80 0.68 175.12 
1.90 1.90 0.00 
1.40 1.10 0.30 
0.88 0.87 0.02 
 Mean 47.95 
 Standard Deviation 62.65 
 
In order to assess the impact of the magnitude of environmental uncertainty, we 
consider a case where the standard deviation of the environmental variable is higher. 
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We compute the value of biodiversity based on the same set of parameters as in the 
earlier case (see Appendix) but with a higher standard deviation of the environmental 
change. Table 2 presents the corresponding simulation results. In this case too, the 
difference between the present values of harvest under full-foresighted and myopic 
regimes is positive, indicating that biodiversity has a positive value. Comparing 
biodiversity values under high and low standard deviation (mean values in Table 1 & 2), 
however, the average biodiversity value is higher with a higher standard deviation. 
Thus, biodiversity is more valuable when the environmental variability is higher. 
Similarly, comparing the standard deviation of biodiversity values in Tables 1 & 2, it is 
shown that the standard deviation of the value of biodiversity is higher when the 
environmental factor has a higher standard deviation. This implies that, for a given 
environmental pattern, the value of biodiversity will be far higher or lower than the 
average when the environmental variation is greater. This result is in line with the 
finding by Kassar and Lasserre (2004) which shows that environmental volatility raises 
the value of diversity by increasing species’ option value and by expanding the target 
conservation area through substitution of currently used species for unused ones.  
 
Table 2: Comparison of Fully Foresighted and Myopic Management Regimes under 
High-Variation Environmental Change (High Standard Deviation) 
 
Present value of harvest 
(Full foresight) 
Present value of harvest 
(Myopia) 
Difference 
1.10 0.82 0.28 
146.20 1.80 144.40 
0.99 0.79 0.20 
111.70 1.00 110.70 
1.20 0.84 0.36 
157.80 1.50 156.30 
1.80 1.60 0.20 
27.90 0.66 27.24 
0.59 0.57 0.03 
115.90 0.82 115.08 
 Mean 55.48 
 Standard Deviation 81.18 
 
 
In order to assess the possible impact of global warming on biodiversity value, 
we consider additional patterns of the environmental factor.  We assume that, with 
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global warming, environmental variables like temperature exhibit increased higher 
volatility and assume positive trends, and consider a case where the average value of the 
environmental variable has an increasing trend and its standard deviation is (arbitrarily) 
high.  
Table 3 presents the results for our assessment of the impact of global warming 
on biodiversity value. The results show that the average value of biodiversity increases 
when the average environmental variable increases combined with a higher standard 
deviation.  This indicates that with global warming, biodiversity becomes more 
valuable. This suggests that, with global warming concerns, biodiversity conservation 
might deserve a special attention where features of global warming make biodiversity 
more valuable.  
Table 3: Comparison of Fully Foresighted and Myopic Management Regimes under 
High-Variation Environmental Change (High Standard Deviation) 
 
Present value of harvest 
(Full foresight) 
Present value of harvest 
(Myopia) 
Difference 
62.20 0.82 61.38 
1.20 0.89 0.31 
0.59 0.59 0.00 
170.10 1.30 168.80 
134.40 1.70 132.70 
135.80 1.10 134.70 
0.96 0.80 0.15 
1.10 1.00 0.10 
1.20 0.70 0.50 
166.70 1.70 165.00 
 Mean 66.36 
 Standard Deviation 73.27 
 
5. Conclusions 
Biodiversity conservation has been one of the great global environmental concerns due 
to the tremendous loss of diversity (Thrupp, 2000), the threat of rapid future depletion 
and huge uncertainty about the consequences (Heal et al., 2004). Designing sound 
conservation policies and wise use of funds calls for a proper understanding of the value 
of biodiversity. The focus of this paper is on assessing the value of biodiversity with 
respect to the joint value shared by different species by emphasizing on species inter-
relationships and their interaction to the environment.  
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Following recent trends in incorporating ecological information into a 
biodiversity valuation framework, this study employs a unique ecological model that 
gives an aggregate characterization of a multiple species ecosystem in terms of 
measures of productivity, responsiveness to environmental change and diversity. The 
model depicts that diversity reduces instant productivity of the system because of the 
presence of suboptimal species under a given environmental condition. On the other 
hand, higher diversity may enhance the ability of the ecosystem to have positive 
adaptive responses to changes in the environment.   
Following Brock and Xepapadeas (2003), our approach develops a measure of 
the value of diversity in terms of the gain in the present value of harvest by comparing 
alternative management regimes. The myopic management corresponds to optimization, 
which takes into account the cost of diversity only. The fully foresighted management 
considers both the costs and potential benefits of diversity.  Using techniques of 
stochastic dynamic optimization, the optimal effort (harvest) rules corresponding to 
myopic and fully foresighted management are obtained. The value of biodiversity is 
calculated as the difference in the discounted stream of net benefits from harvest 
between the two management regimes. Analytical computation of the solutions was not 
possible due to non-linearities and unknown form of the value function. Hence, the 
solutions are based on numerical simulation.  
In existing analyses, biodiversity was shown to have a positive insurance value 
in the presence of environmental stress. Our analysis, which is based on stochastic 
environmental change, also supports this result. In a similar manner, our results show 
that biodiversity assumes a higher value with increase in environmental variability. This 
implies that the positive correlation between biodiversity value and environmental 
volatility is not restricted to species with substitutability in their current use value, as 
shown in previous studies; environmental uncertainty raises the biodiversity value 
irrespective of whether species are compliments and substitutes in their use. 
The principal implication of our analysis is that biodiversity conservation efforts 
should target high environmental-variation areas. This paper has also suggested that 
with global warming concerns, biodiversity conservation might deserve a special 
attention where features of global warming make biodiversity more valuable.
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Appendix 
 
Appendix1: Parameter Values Used in the Simulations 
 
Parameter Base case Higher environmental 
uncertainty 
Global warming 
r 0.01 0.01 0.01 
p 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
s 0.05 0.05 0.05 
K 1000 1000 1000 
a 0.1 0.1 0.1 
b 0.005 0.005 0.005 
v 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Emean 5 5 5 
Estd 0.25 0.5 0.5 
Aamp 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Aper 10 10 10 
CT0 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Xavg0 5 5 5 
Tend 20 20 20 
epsilon 0.008 0.008 0.008 
const 0.00 0.00 0.01 
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Appendix 2: Codes for the simulation results  
 
A. Solution codes for the patterns of total biomass, average phenotype 
and environmental change over time  
 
 
% Parameter values 
global p s K a b v E Xavg0 dt Ccrd Ecrd Tcrd Xcrd dWC; 
r = 0.01; 
p = 0.0001; 
s = 0.05; 
K = 1000; 
a = 0.1; 
b = 0.005; 
v = 0.1; 
Emean = 5; 
Estd = 0.5; 
Aamp = 0.0; 
Aper = 10; 
CT0 = 0.5; 
Xavg0 = 5; 
Tend = 20; 
epsilon=0.008; 
 
verbose=1;   
% Generate E (Brownian motion with mean Emean and stdev Estd) 
seed = sum(100*clock); 
randn('state',seed) % set the state of randn 
N = 1024;  
dt = Tend/N; 
dE = Estd*sqrt(dt)*randn(1,N); % increments 
E = Emean + [0 cumsum(dE)]; % cumulative sum => Brownian motion 
E = Aamp * sin(2*pi/Aper*(0:dt:Tend)) + E;  % Add oscillatory function 
E = max(E,0);  % remove negative values 
 
% solve HJB-equation for myopic case 
disp('Solving HJB-equation, myopic case') 
params=[p*K s 0.0 1.0 Xavg0 v a/K b Aamp Aper Estd epsilon]; 
times=[0.0 1.0 Tend 1];  % Solution times: T0 Tstep Tend saveint 
NC=50; NE=40; 
Cbnd=[-1.0 2.0]; 
Ebnd=[0.0 10.0]; 
mshm=unbmesh([Cbnd Ebnd],[NC NE]); 
wm=callsolver('myopic',times,params,mshm,verbose); 
Ccrd=getxvals(mshm); 
Ecrd=getyvals(mshm); 
Tcrd=times(1):times(2)*times(4):times(3); 
% compute dW/dC 
dWC = zeros(size(wm)); 
dWC(2:end,:,:) = (wm(2:end,:,:)-wm(1:end-1,:,:))/mshm.h(1); 
figure(3) 
[CC,EE]=ndgrid(Ccrd,Ecrd); 
mesh(CC,EE,dWC(:,:,1)) 
title('myopic W_C, at t=0') 
 
 
% solve dynamical system, using HJB solution 
disp('Solving ODEs, myopic case') 
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[Tm,u] = ode15s('FunMyoHJB',[0 Tend],[CT0; Xavg0]); 
 
% Compute optimal values 
CTm = u(:,1); 
Xavgm = u(:,2); 
ETm = interp1(0:dt:Tend,E,Tm); 
wcm = interp3(Ecrd,Ccrd,Tcrd,dWC,ETm,CTm,Tm); 
qm = (p*K-wcm)/(2*s).*CTm; 
Mm = p*K*qm.*CTm-s*qm.^2; 
 
%% Full foresight model %% 
% solve HJB-equation for full foresight case 
disp('Solving HJB-equation, full foresight case') 
epsilon = 0.02; 
params=[p*K s 0.0 1.0 Xavg0 v a/K b Aamp Aper Estd epsilon]; 
times=[0.0 1.0 Tend 1];  % Solution times: T0 Tstep Tend saveint 
NC=30; NE=28; NX=28; 
Xbnd=[0.0 10.0]; 
mshf=unbmesh([Cbnd Ebnd Xbnd],[NC NE NX]); 
wf=callsolver('full foresight',times,params,mshf,verbose); 
Ccrd=getxvals(mshf); 
Ecrd=getyvals(mshf); 
Xcrd=getzvals(mshf); 
Tcrd=times(1):times(2)*times(4):times(3); 
% compute dW/dC 
dWC = zeros(size(wf)); 
dWC(2:end,:,:,:) = (wf(2:end,:,:,:)-wf(1:end-1,:,:,:))/mshf.h(1); 
figure(4) 
[CC,EE]=ndgrid(Ccrd,Ecrd); 
mesh(CC,EE,dWC(:,:,NX/2,1)) 
title(sprintf('full foresight W_C, at X=%.1f, t=0',Xbnd(2)/2)) 
 
% Solve dynamical system, using HJB-solution 
disp('Solving ODEs, full foresight') 
[Tf,u] = ode15s('FunFullHJB',[0 Tend],[CT0; Xavg0]); 
 
% compute optimal values 
CTf=u(:,1); 
Xavgf = u(:,2); 
ETf = interp1(0:dt:Tend,E,Tf); 
wcf = interpn(Ccrd,Ecrd,Xcrd,Tcrd,dWC,CTf,ETf,Xavgf,Tf); 
qf = (p*K-wcf)/(2*s).*CTf; 
 
Mf = p*K*qf.*CTf-s*qf.^2; 
 
 
% Plot results 
figure(1) 
subplot(3,1,1) 
plot(Tf,K*CTf,'b',Tm,K*CTm,'r--') 
title('C_T'); 
xlabel('time') 
legend('Full foresight','Myopic'); 
 
subplot(3,1,2) 
plot(0:dt:Tend,E,'k') 
title('E(t)') 
 
subplot(3,1,3) 
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plot(Tf,Xavgf,'b',Tm,Xavgm,'r--') 
title('X_{avg}') 
 
figure(2) 
plot(Tf,Mf,'b',Tm,Mm,'r--') 
title('M') 
 
figure(5) 
plot(Tf,wcf,'b',Tm,wcm,'r--') 
title('W_C') 
 
% compute integral from 0 to Tm (Tf) 
Intm = trapz(Tm,exp(-r*Tm).*Mm) 
Intf = trapz(Tf,exp(-r*Tf).*Mf) 
 
 
B. Codes for recalling the discrete solution 
 
function w=callsolver(ptype,times,params,msh,verbose) 
fh=fopen('tmpin.txt','wt'); 
if (fh==-1)  
 error('Could not open file tmpin.txt'); 
end fprintf(fh,'%s\n',ptype); 
fprintf(fh,'n: %d ',length(msh.n)); 
fprintf(fh,'%d ',msh.n); 
fprintf(fh,'\n'); 
fprintf(fh,'bounds: %d ',length(msh.bounds)); 
fprintf(fh,'%g ',msh.bounds); 
fprintf(fh,'\n'); 
fprintf(fh,'times: %d ',length(times)); 
fprintf(fh,'%g ',times); 
fprintf(fh,'\n'); 
fprintf(fh,'params: %d ',length(params)); 
fprintf(fh,'%g ',params); 
fprintf(fh,'\n'); 
% options (tolf tolrel tolst maxit tolsol maxitsol verbose) 
fprintf(fh,'options: 7 %g %g %g %d %g %d %d\n',1.e-6,0.0,1.e-6,20,1.e-
5,1000,verbose); 
fclose(fh); 
% Call solver 
if ispc, 
!hjb tmpin.txt tmpout.dat 
Else 
!./hjb tmpin.txt tmpout.dat 
End 
 
W=loadcmat('tmpout.dat'); 
Nt=size(W,2); 
w = reshape(W,[msh.n Nt]);  
function M=loadcmat(filename) 
if ischar(filename), 
  f=fopen(filename,'r'); 
  if f==-1, 
    error(['Could not open ' filename]); 
  end 
else 
  f=filename; 
end 
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m=fread(f,1,'int32'); 
n=fread(f,1,'int32'); 
[M,cnt]=fread(f,[m n],'double'); 
if cnt~=m*n, 
  error(ferror(f)); 
end 
 
if ischar(filename), 
  fclose(f); 
end 
 
C. Codes for interpoliation and solving the differential equations  
 
function y=FunFullHJB(t,u); 
 
global p s K a b v E dt dWC Ecrd Ccrd Tcrd Xcrd;   % global parameters 
set in main file 
 
if length(E)==1 
  ev=E; 
else 
  ev = E(floor(t/dt)+1); 
end 
% find dW/dC(E,C,X,t) 
wc = interpn(Ccrd,Ecrd,Xcrd,Tcrd,dWC,u(1),ev,u(2),t); 
 
% rescaled equation ( C = C_T/K ) 
y = [(1-2*v-(ev-u(2)).^2)*(1-u(1)).*u(1) + a/K - (p*K-
wc)/(2*s)*u(1).^2; ... 
     2*v*(1-u(1))*(ev-u(2)) + b];  
 
 
function y=FunMyoHJB(t,u) 
 
global p s K Q a b v Xavg0 E dt dWC Ecrd Ccrd Tcrd;   % global 
parameters set in main file 
 
if length(E)==1 
  ev=E; 
else 
  ev = E(floor(t/dt)+1); 
end 
% find dW/dC(E,C,t) 
wc = interp3(Ecrd,Ccrd,Tcrd,dWC,ev,u(1),t); 
 
% rescaled equation (C = C_T/K) 
y = [(Q-2*v-(ev-u(2)).^2)*(1-u(1)).*u(1) + a/K - 100*(p*K-
wc)/(2*s)*u(1).^2; ... 
     2*v*(1-u(1))*(ev-u(2)) + b]; 
 
 
D. Codes used for plotting the value function 
 
function [X,Y,Z]=getcoordmat(m) 
 
x=getxvals(m); 
y=getyvals(m); 
 
if length(m.n)==2, 
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  [X,Y]=ndgrid(x,y); 
else 
  z=getzvals(m); 
  [X,Y,Z]=ndgrid(x,y,z); 
End 
 
 
function c=getnodecoords(m,idx) 
 
% Gets coordinates of mesh points in row vector idx 
% coords in columns of c, with mesh points along rows 
 
switch length(m.n) 
  case 2 
    kx=mod(idx-1,m.n(1)); 
    ky=(idx-kx-1)/m.n(1); 
    c(1,:)=m.bounds(1)+(kx+1)*m.h(1); 
    c(2,:)=m.bounds(3)+(ky+1)*m.h(2); 
  case 3 
    n0=m.n(1)*m.n(2); 
    kxy=mod(idx-1,n0); 
    kz=(idx-1-kxy)/n0; 
    kx=mod(kxy,m.n(1)); 
    ky=(kxy-kx)/m.n(1); 
    c(1,:)=m.bounds(1)+(kx+1)*m.h(1); 
    c(2,:)=m.bounds(3)+(ky+1)*m.h(2); 
    c(3,:)=m.bounds(5)+(kz+1)*m.h(3); 
end 
 
 
function x=getxvals(m) 
 
%Returns x-values of mesh points 
 
x=m.bounds(1)+m.h(1):m.h(1):m.bounds(2)-m.h(1); 
 
 
function y=getyvals(m) 
 
%Returns y-values of mesh points 
 
y=m.bounds(3)+m.h(2):m.h(2):m.bounds(4)-m.h(2); 
 
 
function z=getzvals(m) 
 
%Returns z-values of mesh points 
 
z=m.bounds(5)+m.h(3):m.h(3):m.bounds(6)-m.h(3); 
 
 
unction v = subsref(m,index) 
%SUBSREF Define field name indexing for unbmesh objects 
%Allows direct indexing into member arrays, e.g. m.bounds(2) 
switch index(1).type 
  case '()' 
    error('Array indexing not supported by mesh objects') 
  case '.' 
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    switch index(1).subs 
      case 'bounds' 
 if length(index)>1, 
   if index(2).type=='()', 
     v = m.bounds(index(2).subs{1}); 
   end 
 else  
   v = m.bounds; 
 end 
      case 'n' 
 if length(index)>1, 
   if index(2).type=='()', 
     v = m.n(index(2).subs{1}); 
   end 
 else  
   v = m.n; 
 end 
      case 'h' 
 if length(index)>1, 
   if index(2).type=='()', 
     v = m.h(index(2).subs{1}); 
   end 
 else  
   v = m.h; 
 end 
      case 'N' 
 v = m.N; 
   % Additional indexing to 'virtual' properties 
      case 'xmin' 
 v = m.bounds(1); 
      case 'xmax' 
 v = m.bounds(2); 
      case 'ymin' 
 v = m.bounds(3); 
      case 'ymax' 
 v = m.bounds(4); 
      case 'zmin' 
 v = m.bounds(5); 
      case 'zmax' 
 v = m.bounds(6); 
      case 'nx' 
 v = m.n(1); 
      case 'ny' 
 v = m.n(2); 
      case 'nz' 
 v = m.n(3); 
      case 'hx' 
 v = m.h(1); 
      case 'hy' 
 v = m.h(2); 
      case 'hz' 
 v = m.h(3); 
      otherwise 
 error('Invalid field name') 
    end 
  case '{}' 
    error('Cell array indexing not supported by unbmesh objects') 
end 
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function m=unbmesh(varargin) 
 
% UNBMESH constructor, umesh(bounds,[nx ny nz]) 
% 
% Class unbmesh: 
%   A uniform mesh in which the boundaries are NOT included 
% 
% Properties: 
% 
% m.bounds  : [xmin xmax ymin ymax (zmin zmax)] 
%             m.xmin, etc. may also be accessed independently 
% m.h       : [hx hy (hz)] mesh size in different directions 
% m.n       : [nx ny (nz)] nr of mesh points in diff. dirs 
% m.N       : The total number of mesh points. 
% 
% Methods: 
% 
% v=IsEdgeNode(m,[i]) : Determines if mesh nodes in vector [i] are on 
edge. 
%                       Returns boolean vector v. 
% v=GetEdgeNodes(m)   : returns nrs of all edge nodes in v. 
% v=GetNodeCoords(m,[i]) : Returns node coords of nodes in [i].  
%                          Coords in colums. 
% v=GetXVals(m)       : Returns the x-values of mesh points 
% v=GetYVals(m) 
% v=GetZVals(m) 
% [i j]=FindAdjMeshPts(m,iip) : Finds adjacent mesh points to iip. 
% 
% 
 
switch nargin, 
  case 0 
    m.bounds = zeros(1,4); 
    m.n = zeros(1,2); 
    m.h = zeros(1,2); 
    m.N = 0; 
    m = class(m,'unbmesh'); 
  case 1 
    if isa(varargin{1},'unbmesh') 
      m=varargin{1}; 
    else 
      error('Wrong argument type') 
    end 
  case 2 
    m.bounds = varargin{1}; 
    m.n = varargin{2}; 
    m.h(1)=(m.bounds(2)-m.bounds(1))/(m.n(1)+1); 
    m.h(2)=(m.bounds(4)-m.bounds(3))/(m.n(2)+1); 
    m.N = m.n(1)*m.n(2); 
    if length(m.n)==3, 
      m.h(3)=(m.bounds(6)-m.bounds(5))/(m.n(3)+1); 
      m.N = m.N*m.n(3); 
    end 
    m=class(m,'unbmesh'); 
  otherwise 
    error('Wrong number of arguments') 
end 
 
 
